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INTRODUCTION

European Union (EU) development of the Internal Energy Market is
imminent. This article discusses open access in the European gas industry,
which is closely following the 1997 progress in the electricity sector. Once
the rules are completed, the federal-like Internal Energy Market will promote
allocative efficiency and a secure supply of energy. It will coordinate
licensing, rate setting, and dispute resolution procedures and provide
transparent commodity and transportation rates. Re-regulation will encourage
lower prices and increased benefits for energy users.
Part II describes structural characteristics of the Internal Energy Market,
identifies major environmental and security of supply concerns, and discusses
the European Energy Charter as the basis for long-term, EU cooperation in
the area of energy. Common-carriage and direct-interruptible sales proposals
have been stymied until recently. Opposition stemmed largely from an
oligopolistic European gas industry of economically self-interested, large
producers.
Part III discusses European common-carriage proposals. Monopolistic
gas companies currently inhibit the public interest by dominating the
European gas industry through long-term take-or-pay contracts. This part
suggests that third-party access to a European gas transport system is needed
to increase competition and promote the public interest in market-driven
prices, as opposed to artificially high prices, and in equal access to energy.
This part also argues that price transparency, a requirement that gas utilities
disclose their rates to the public, is a prerequisite to free competition in the
gas industry.
Part IV discusses the practical enforceability of EU common-carriage
proposals within the general framework of EU competition law. Part V
concludes that the steps taken towards free competition within a single
European Internal Energy Market do not go far enough, and reasserts that the
intransigence of vested interests has slowed progress.
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II.

THE STRUCTURE AND PROBLEMS OF THE EUROPEAN ENERGY

MARKET

A.

European Union Integration

Responsible regulation of energy is an increasingly topical issue within
the European Union.' This part sets the background to the specific process
of increased natural gas competition by identifying basic EU constitutional
arrangements and the broad integration impact of EU law. It identifies the
economic mischief that is being remedied by the Single European Act
(SEA) 2 and the Treaty on European Union (Maastricht Treaty). 3 In this
broad sense, European law is not static, but is incrementally evolving towards
federalism.
B.

European Union ConstitutionalLaw

In 1951, France, the German Federal Republic, Italy, Belgium, the
Netherlands, and Luxembourg established, by the Treaty of Paris, the
European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC). 4 In 1957, by the two Treaties
of Rome, these States subsequently created the European Economic
Community (EEC Treaty)5 and the European Atomic Energy Community
(EURATOM). 6 A single Court, Assembly, Council of Ministers, and

1. See generally Leigh Hancher, A Single European Market for Oil and Gas - The
Legal Obstacles, 8 J. ENERGY & NAT. RESOURCES L. 77 (1990).
2. Single European Act [SEA], 1987 O.J. (L 169) 1 [hereinafter SEA] (amending
TREATY ESTABLISHING THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC COMMUNITY, Mar. 25, 1957, 298 U.N.T.S.
11, 1973 Gr. Brit. T.S. No. I (Cmnd. 5179-II) [hereinafter EEC TREATY], in Treaties
Establishing the European Communities (EC Off'1 Pub. Off. 1987)). The SEA amended the
three then existing European Community treaties. DERRICK WYATT & ALAN DASHWOOD,
EUROPEAN COMMUNITY LAW 14 (3d ed. 1993). One of the Act's main objectives was the
completion of the internal energy market by 1992. Id.
3. TREATY ON EUROPEAN UNION, Feb. 7, 1992, 1992 O.J. (C 224) 1, 1 C.M.L.R. 719,
31 I.L.M. 247 [hereinafter TEU] (amending EEC TREATY, supra note 2) (popular name:
Maastricht Treaty).
4. TREATY ESTABLISHING THE EUROPEAN COAL AND STEEL COMMUNITY, Apr. 18, 1951,
261 U.N.T.S. 167 [hereinafter ECSC TREATY], as amended in Treaties Establishing the
European Communities (EC Off'l Pub. Off. 1987),
5. EEC TREATY, supra note 2. The original 1957 EEC TREATY was amended by the
SEA and TEU; the TEU mandated that the word economic be deleted from the title so that
it is now known as the EUROPEAN COMMUNITY TREATY. TREATY ESTABLISHING THE
EUROPEAN COMMUNITY, Feb. 7, 1992, 1 C.M.L.R. 573 (1992) [hereinafter EC TREATY],
incorporating changes made by TEU, supra note 3.
6. TREATY ESTABLISHING THE EUROPEAN ATOMIC ENERGY COMMUNITY, Mar. 25, 1957,
298 U.N.T.S. 167 [hereinafter EURATOM TREATY], as amended in Treaties Establishing the
European Communities (EC Off'l Pub. Off. 1987),

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 1995

3

Florida Journal of International Law, Vol. 10, Iss. 1 [1995], Art. 6
FLORIDA JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW

[Vol. 10

Commission exists for all three Communities,7 although until implementation
of the Maastricht Treaty, they remained technically distinct entities.
Following the signing of the Treaty of Accession in Brussels in 1972,8 the
United Kingdom, Denmark, and the Republic of Ireland acceded effective
January 1, 1973. 9 Subsequently, Greece became a member in 1981,1 and
both Spain and Portugal in 1986.11 Following the collapse of the Soviet
Union, Austria, Sweden, and Finland joined the juggernaut of European
Union Membership.
One representative from each of the governments of the Member States
constitute the Council, 12 which is generally attended by the relevant Foreign
Ministers.13 The Council makes general policy decisions and adopts formal
legal acts, invariably based on proposals made by the Commission. 4
Proposals are usually transmitted by the Council to the Parliament for its
opinion.'" However, specialized Council meetings may involve ministers
responsible for a particular subject, such as agriculture or transport. 6 The
office of President
of the Council is held for six months, rotating among the
7
Member States.'
Council agreements are normally reached without using the formal voting
procedures prescribed by treaty, which otherwise require the taking of most
decisions by a qualified majority vote.'8 A .different decision-making
procedure exists where a Member State feels that an important national
interest is at stake.' 9 Pursuant to the Accords de Luxembourg (Luxembourg
Compromise) in 1965, unanimity is required before a decision can be taken
in these circumstances.2"
Seventeen representative from Member States constitute the Commission,

7. WYATT & DASHWOOD, supra note 2, at 9.
8.

1972 TREATY OF ACCESSION TO THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES, 1979 TS 16 (Cmnd.

5179, 7461), as amended in 1979.
9. WYATr & DASHWOOD, supra note 2, at 11.
10. Id.; see E.C. BULL., no. 1, at points 1101-11 & Supp. 2/76 (1976).
11. WYATr & DASHWOOD, supra note 2, at 11; see E.C. BULL., no. 6, at point 111.
12. EC TREATY art. 146, supra note 5; WYATT & DASHWOOD, supra note 2, at 22.
13. EC TREATY art. 146, supra note 5; WYATr & DASHWOOD, supra note 2, at 22.
14. EC TREATY art. 153, supra note 5; WYATT & DASHWOOD, supra note 2, at 26.
15. WYATT & DASHWOOD, supra note 2, at 31.

16. Id. at 22.
17. EC TREATY art. 146, supra note 5; WYAT & DASHWOOD, supra note 2, at 23.
18. WYAT & DASHWOOD, supra note 2, at 44. Member States have weighted votes:
France, Germany, Italy, and the United Kingdom each have 10 votes; Spain has 8; Belgium,
Greece, the Netherlands and Portugal have 5 votes each; Denmark and Ireland have 3 each;
and Luxembourg has 2. Id. at 44 n.55. A qualified majority is 54 votes out of a possible 76.
0. HOOD PHILLIPS & PAUL JACKSON, 0. HOOD PHILLIPS' CONSTITUTIONAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 94 n.2 (7th ed. 1987).
19. WYATT & DASHWOOD, supra note 2, at 46.
20. Id.
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which acts collectively by majority vote.21 Appointed by agreement of the
governments of the Member States, the Commission must act independently
in the interest of the Union.22 Indeed, an important deficiency of this
nonelected executive organ is its lack of direct accountability to the EU
electorate. France, Germany, Italy, Spain, and the United Kingdom have two
Commissioners each, and the smaller members have one each. 23 The
Commission makes policy proposals to the Council, adopts certain formal
acts, and drafts legislative acts for Council adoption.24 It also enforces the
EC Treaty by initiating action against a Member State for treaty violations
and can ultimately take proceedings against a Member State before the
European Court of Justice (ECJ).25
Unlike other governmental forums with legislative powers, the European
Parliament, also known as the Assembly, functions in a deliberative and
consultative manner. 26 Beginning 1979, the members of the EU Parliament
are elected directly by universal suffrage. 27 The Parliament represents the
Member States, yet does not constitute a government as does the United
Kingdom's Parliament. 28 The Council consults the Parliament on proposals
submitted to it by the Commission, and the Parliament can make comments
or even make nonbinding amendments.2 9 The Parliament can ask questions
about the work of the Council or Commission and force the College of
Commissioners' resignation following a motion of censure with a two-thirds
majority.3
Judicial functions of the European Community are performed by the ECJ,
which consists of thirteen Judges appointed from the Member States who are
aided by six Advocate Generals. 31 "[O]ne Judge is appointed from each
Member State, the 13th post being held by nationals of the five larger
States, 3 2 which include the United Kingdom, Germany, Italy, Spain, and
France. 33 "There is one Advocate General from the four largest Member
States, while the fifth and sixth ... rotate among the eight smaller Member

21.
22.
at 27.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.

EC TREATY art. 157, supra note 5; PHILLIPS & JACKSON, supra note 18, at 94.
EC TREATY arts. 157(2), 158(2), supra note 5; WYATT & DASHWOOD, supra note 2,
WYATT & DASHWOOD, supra note 2, at 27.
Id. at 28-30, 47.
EC TREATY art. 169, supra note 5; WYATT & DASHWOOD, supra note 2, at 52.
WYATT & DASHWOOD, supra note 2, at 31.
EC TREATY art. 138, supra note 5; WYAT & DASHWOOD, supra note 2, at 31.
See WYATT & DASHWOOD, supra note 2, at 31-36.
EC TREATY art. 138b, supra note 5; WYATT & DASHWOOD, supra note 2, at 32-36.
EC TREATY art. 144, supra note 5; WYATT & DASHWOOD, supra note 2, at 36.
EC TREATY arts. 165-66, supra note 5; WYATT & DASHWOOD, supra note 2, at 104.
WYATT & DASHWOOD, supra note 2, at 105 (citation omitted).
Id. at 105 n.16.
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States., 34 The ECJ hears contentious matters between Member States
concerning the terms of the various European treaties.
It adjudicates
matters brought by EU institutions against Member States for noncompliance
and by Member States challenging the validity of actions taken by EU
institutions such as the Council and Commission. 6 Sitting in Luxembourg,
the President of the Court is elected collegially by the Judges.37 Procedurally, the function of the six Advocates General differs from the adversarial
practice in England and Scotland.38
Article 167 of the EC Treaty arguably creates an uneven federalism,
because the Judges are appointed by Member States, albeit with a common
accord, and not by a federal body.39 Preliminary rulings may be issued
pursuant to Article 177, including cases arising in the national courts of the
Member States. 40 These rulings include interpreting the Treaty, acts, and
statutes of EU organs. 4 This advisory jurisdiction, as already stated,
operating via Article 177, allows the ECJ to issue preliminary rulings on EU
law at the request of Member States courts.4 2
Courts or tribunals of Member States may request the ECJ to give a
preliminary ruling if they consider a ruling is necessary in order for the
domestic court to give judgment.4 3 When a question of EU law arises and
there is no judicial remedy under national law, domestic courts must make
reference to the ECJ." This provision was considered by the ECJ, which
concluded that there is no duty to refer a question where the question is
34. Id. at 105 (citation omitted).
35. EC TREATY art. 164, supra note 5; WYATT & DASHWOOD, supra note 2, at 52.
36. WYATT & DASHWOOD, supra note 2, at 109-10, 120.
37. EC TREATY art. 167, supra note 5; WYATr & DASHWOOD, supra note 2, at 104-05.
38. Gordon Slynn, The Court of Justice ofthe European Communities, 33 INT'L & COMP.
L.Q. 409, 427-29 (1984).
39. EC TREATY art. 167, supra note 5.
40. EC TREATY art. 177, supra note 5.
41. Id.
42. Id.; P.D. Dagtoglou, The English Judges and European Community Law, 1978 C.L.J.
76; see, e.g., EC TREATY arts. 173 (annulment), 175 (failure to act), 178 (damages), supra
note 5.
43. EC TREATY art. 177, supra note 5; see Customs & Excise Cmm'rs v. ApS Samex,
[1983] 1 All E.R. 1042, 1043-44 (Eng.). In H.P. Bulmer Ltd. v. J. Bollinger SA, Lord
Denning stated guidelines by which British courts should decide whether a decision is
necessary and guidelines on exercising this discretion, including: (1) the decision must be
necessary to enable the English court to give judgment; (2) the decision of the question must
be conclusive of the case; (3) the court must still consider the delay involved, the difficulty
and importance of the point, the expense, and the burden on the European Court; and finally,
(4) the court should decide the facts before considering whether to make a reference to the
European court. 1974 Ch. 401, 421-25 (Eng. C.A.); see also The Queen v. Plymouth Justices,
Exparte Rogers, 1982 Q.B. 863 (Eng.).
44. EC TREATY art. 177, supra note 5; see R.S.C., Ord. 114 (Eng.) (dealing with
references by the High Court (England) to the European Court and appeals from the High
Court in such cases to the Court of Appeal).
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irrelevant.4" In other words, if the answer to the question, regardless of
what it may be, cannot affect the outcome of the case, then there exists no
duty to refer the question to the ECJ. Secondly, there is no duty to refer a
question that is materially similar to one already decided by the Court. There
also is no need to refer in the absence of real doubt about the law. However,
national courts must be convinced that the matter is equally obvious to the
courts of the other Member States and to the ECJ.
An example of a reference to the ECJ from the High Court in England
is Van Duyn v. Home Office.4 6 The Dutch plaintiff had been offered
employment as a secretary with the Church of Scientology's college in
England.47 The immigration officer refused her leave to enter under the
Immigration Act of 1971, deeming the exclusion conducive to the public
good. 48 Given Article 48 of the EEC Treaty on the freedom of movement
of workers, the Vice-Chancellor held that issues of fact and of national law
should be determined before reference was made to the ECJ. 49 Furthermore, the Vice-Chancellor declared that the question of whether Article 48
confers rights enforceable in the courts of Member States should be
determined by reference to the ECJ before trial of the action.5"
C.

Impact of European Union Law on Member States

Section 2(1) of the European Communities Bill of 1972 (Communities
Act), enacted by the British Parliament, provides that all rights, remedies,
procedures, and obligations created or arising under the EU treaties are to be
given legal effect without further enactment in the United Kingdom.5 The
expression "enforceable Community right" refers to the recognition and
enforcement in the United Kingdom of directly effective or applicable
Community rights and obligations enjoyed by or imposed on Member States
or private individuals.5 2 It covers rights and obligations created by the
Treaties themselves, existing and future EU regulations, 3 which take effect

45. See Case 283/81, C.I.L.F.I.T. v. Ministry of Health, 1982 E.C.R. 3415, 1 C.M.L.R.
472 (1983).
46. Case 41/74, Van Duyn V. Home Office, 1974 E.C.R. 1337, 1350-51, 1 C.M.L.R. 1
(1975).
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. European Communities Bill § 2(1) (1972) [hereinafter Communities Act], reprinted
in J.D. Mitchell et al., ConstitutionalAspects of the Treaty and Legislation Relating to British
Membership, 9 COMMON MKT. L. REv. 134, app. at 150-66 (1972).
52. Id.
53. EC TREATY art. 189, supra note 5. A regulation is "binding in its entirety and
directly applicable in all Member States." Id.
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directly in the Member States, and directives54 to the extent that they are
directly effective or applicable."
If a certain EU provision is not directly applicable, then it is not part of
United Kingdom law until domestic legislation is enacted pursuant to section
2(2) of the Communities Act.56 Thus, a directly applicable provision,
whether it is a provision of the EC Treaty, a regulation or a directive, or a
decision made under the EC Treaty, must be clear, unconditional, and need
no implementation by domestic legislation57 and cannot only concern interUnion relations. Afterwards, it has the required direct effect of being
sufficiently clear and precise to allow a litigant to rely upon it in a court of
a Member State.5 For instance, the British courts, in Application des Gaz
S.A. v. Falks Veritas, Ltd., 9 gave direct effect to Articles 85 and 86 of the
or amount
EC Treaty, which forbid practices that unduly reduce competition
60
to an abuse of a dominant trading position, respectively.
European Union directives set out the objects to be achieved, leaving
Member States free to choose the method of achieving them. 6' These
directives and other existing and future EU laws that are not directly effective
or applicable may be given effect pursuant to Section 2(2) of the Communities Act. 62 Typically, the legal instrument used is either an Order in
Supplementary matters, including
Council or ministerial regulation.63
references to the ECJ, may be dealt with by subordinate legislative power

54. Id. "A directive shall be binding as to the result to be achieved upon each Member
State .... ." Id.
55. Communities Act § 2(1)-(2), in Mitchell et al., supra note 51, app. at 150-51; see
Mitchell et al., supra note 51, at 137.
56. Communities Act § 2(1), in Mitchell et al., supra note 51, app. at 150-51; see Mitchell
et al., supra note 51, at 138-89; see also In re Westinghouse Electric Corp. Uranium Contract
Litigation, 1978 App. Cas. 547, 564 (Lord Denning stated that Community law is part of
British domestic law "lock, stock and barrel.").
57. Mark Friend, JudicialReview, Private Rights and Community Law, 1985 PUB. L. 21,
22. Inter-Community and inter-Union refer to the relations, including trade, of Member States
inter se. They are akin to the terms inter-state or inter-provincial, as opposed to intra-state
or intra-provincial in U.S. and Canadian law.
58. Id. at 21-22. However, this is a matter of interpretation, because the tenor of some
directly applicable Community rules does not necessarily create individual rights. Id. at 21.
See generally Josephine Steiner, DirectApplicability in EEC Law - A Chameleon Concept,
98 L.Q. REV. 229 (1982) (discussing the elusive nature of the concept of direct applicability).
59. 1974 Ch. 381 (Eng. C.A.), 2 C.M.L.R. 75 (1974) (citing Case 127/73, Belgische Radio
en Televisie & Societe v. SV SABAM, 1974 E.C.R. 51, 2 C.M.L.R. 238 (1974)).
60. EC TREATY arts. 85-86, supra note 5. Articles 85 and 86 attempt to prohibit policies
aimed at price fixing and restricting market sharing, and the use of a dominant position to
control such ends. Id.
61. Id. art. 189.
62. Communities Act § 2(2), in Mitchell et al., supra note 51, app. at 151; see Mitchell
et al., supra note 51, at 138-39.
63. Communities Act § 2(2), in Mitchell et al., supra note 51, app. at 151.
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64
under section 2(2), which itself is limited pursuant to schedule 2.
European Union law is not static but is rather like a "living tree" 65 that
incrementally grows and develops through regulations, decisions, and
directives, as well as the decisions of the ECJ. In Britain, concern exists
about accountability and inadequate opportunity for the House of Commons
to comment upon and influence draft EU legislation. Although the British
Parliament has created select committees and subcommittees to scrutinize
legislation by the European Council, it does not systematically review the
bulk of secondary community legislation that is made by the Commission.'

D.

The Maastricht Treaty

Closer EU integration has followed the implementation of the Maastricht
Treaty.67 For instance, its terms will be implemented into British law via
the Communities Act (Amendment).68 These terms include: (1) common
citizenship for all nationals of EU Countries; 69 (2) a single European
currency by January 1, 1999, at the latest;70 (3) new powers for the
European Parliament to veto measures proposed by the nonelected Commission;71 (4) common action on asylum, immigration, and the fight against
drugs and terrorism; 72 and (5) "a separate social chapter," targeting
improvements in working conditions, a dialogue between workers and
management, and proper social protection of employees.73 However, British
Prime Minister John Major secured the following three concessions: (1) the
word "federal" was removed from the text that contemplates a process of

64. Id. Under sch. 2 § l(la-d), § 2(2) of the Communities Act does not include the power
to: impose or increase taxation, legislate with retroactive effect, confer power of subdelegation, except "rules of procedure of any court," or "create any new criminal offense
punishable with imprisonment for more than two years or punishable on summary conviction
with imprisonment for more than three months or with a fine of more than £400 (if not
calculated on a daily basis) or with a fine of more than £5 a day." Id. at 166.
65. Edwards v. Canada, 1930 App. Cas. 124 (J.C. 1929) (appeal taken from Canada).
Lord Sankey stated his famous "living tree metaphor" in which he likened the British North
America Act, which is the predecessor of Canada's current constitution, to having "planted
in Canada a living tree capable of growth and expansion within its natural limits." Id. at 136.
66. See, e.g., SELECT COMM. ON EUROPEAN LEGISLATION, SECOND SPECIAL REP., H.C.
400 (1985-86); SELECT COMM. ON EUROPEAN LEGISLATION, FIRST SPECIAL REP., H.C. 527
(1983-84); see also Lord Fraser of Tullybelton, Scrutiny of Community Legislation in the
United Kingdom Parliament,in 1 IN MEMORIAM J.D.B. MITCHELL 29 (St. John Bates et al.
eds., 1983).
67. TEU, supra note 3.
68. See generally Mitchell et al., supra note 51.
69. TEU art. B, supra note 3.
70. Id.
71. TEU, supra note 3.
72. Id. art. K.I(1), K.1(3), K.1(4), K.1(9), respectively.
73. EC TREATY arts. 117-118b, art. 122, supra note 5.
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creating "an ever closer union among the peoples of Europe;" (2) Britain
would be allowed a separate decision at a later stage to join the single
currency and accordingly scrap the pound; and (3) the "social chapter" was
deleted from the main treaty, becoming a separate document that was signed
by all Member countries except Britain.7 4 However, the election of a
Labour Government in May 1997, led by Mr. Tony Blair, may alter this state
of affairs.
In order to qualify for economic and monetary union in 1999, the
Maastricht Treaty requires a public sector deficit below 3% of gross domestic
product (GDP) of each Member state wishing to join the European Monetary
75
Union (EMU), the process of achieving a single European currency.
Speculation on who will be the founding members of economic and monetary
union in 1999 suggests that Germany, Austria, Belgium, Luxembourg, the
Netherlands, and France will take advantage of a quick start in this
integrating economic mechanism. The Maastricht Treaty promotes the
principle of subsidiarity, providing that Community action not go beyond
what was necessary in order to achieve the Treaty's objectives.76 The
Treaty shows that "EC members have now chosen to 'broaden' the
Community and embrace a wider, more open and outward-looking vision."7 7
E. European Union Goals: The Single European Act
The idea of a single internal market is relatively simple, yet the
progressive establishment of such a "barrier-free system" is quite difficult.7"
Physical frontier barriers and controls restricting the free movement of goods
and people were eliminated in their entirety by 1993 .79 Technical barriers
that operate unfairly include different environmental and product standards
as well as divergent public procurement requirements. 80 Public procurement

74. See id. art. 122.

75. Id. art. 104c; EC Protocol (No. 5) on the Excessive Deficit Procedure, art. 1.
76. Cornelius A.J. Herkstr6ter, The New Europe, 1992 THE SHELL LEC. 3 (Group Public
Affairs, SIPC, London).
77. Id. at 1-2.
78. See Alan C. Page, Competition and Monopoly in the United Kingdom Energy Supply
- The Case of Gas, 2 J. ENERGY & NAT. RESOURCES L. 30, 32-33 (1984). In a petroleum

context, the "landing requirement" for petroleum in the United Kingdom, restrictions on the
liquefaction of natural gas, and permission requirements for pipeline construction were
arguably indirect barriers to the export of gas from the United Kingdom. Id. at 32.
79. EC TREATY art. 8(a), supra note 5; Completing the Internal Market: White Paper from
the Commission to the European Council, COM(85)310 final at 9-16 [hereinafter Completing
the Internal Market].
80. The Internal Energy Market: Commission of the European Communities, COM(88)238
final at 15 [hereinafter The Internal Energy Market]. The Commission has subsequently
described procurement as "an extremely vast area which is little known and where intervention
by public authorities ...is rarely official." Id. at 15.

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/fjil/vol10/iss1/6

10

1995]

Black: European Law and Public Utility Open Access
EUROPEANLAW AND PUBLIC UTILITY

concerns purchases and works. Directive 90/531 opened competition to this
big market and applies to the so-called excluded sectors of water, transport,
energy, and telecommunications.8' Fiscal and business barriers concern
indirect taxation such as excise duties, free movement of capital and services,

mutual recognition of professional qualifications, harmonization of merger
law, accounting standards, and regulation of subsidies.8 2
Idealistically, the single internal market calls for a Europe "without
internal frontiers" within an internal customs union.8 3 This system promotes
freedom in four areas pertaining to goods,8' persons,8 5 services,8 6 and
capital.8 7 Although these four objectives are primarily economic, there are
derogation or exception clauses that apply to all four areas in order to protect
the character, traditions, and heritage of each Member State. 8 A further
fundamental principle of the single internal market is the development of a
common agricultural policy among the Member States. 9 Public ownership
or participation in European utilities, which is relatively high, is protected by
Article 222 of the EC Treaty. 90 Yet, behavior of utilities, as market
participants, is governed by Articles 85 through 93, which state the general
rules on competition, even where such behavior is induced by state-imposed
regulation. 9'

81. Directive 90/531, 1990 O.J. (L 297) 1, 29 (regarding public procurement). See
generally David Marks & Rosemary Bointon, The European Community Public Procurement
Rules and the Oil and Gas Industry: The Current Position, 10 OIL & GAS L. & TAX'N REV.
344 (1990).
82. See Marks & Bointon, supra note 81, at 344-47.
83. C.D. Ehlermann, The Internal Market Following the Single European Act, 24
COMMON MKT. L. REv. 361, 363-64 (1987) (explaining the provisions of the SEA from a
historical approach); Blanche Sas, Implications for the Petroleum Industry: The Single
European Market and the Development of European Law (1992) (unpublished manuscript, on
file with author).
84. EC TREATY arts. 30-31, supra note 5 (elimination of barriers, charges, and measures
incompatible with the free movement of goods). Impediments to the free movement of goods
include restrictions by the United Kingdom on the importation of potatoes, Case 231/78,
Commission v. United Kingdom, 1979 E.C.R. 1447,2 C.M.L.R. 427 (1979); and poultry, Case
40/82, Commission v. United Kingdom, 1982 E.C.R. 2793; and French impediments to
imports of lamb from the United Kingdom, Joined Cases 24 & 97/80R, Commission v. France,
1980 E.C.R. 1319.
85. EC TREATY art. 48, supra note 5.
86. EC TREATY arts. 59-60, supra note 5.
87. EC TREATY art. 67, supra note 5.
88. EC TREATY art. 36 (exceptions for goods); art. 48(4) (exceptions for persons); art. 65
(exceptions for services); art. 70(2), art. 73(1)-(2) (exceptions for capital), supra note 5.
89. EC TREATY art. 38, supra note 5. The common agricultural policy has been
controversial. See generally FRANCIS G. SNYDER, LAW OF THE COMMON AGRICULTURAL
POLICY (1985).
90. EC TREATY art. 222, supra note 5.
91. EC TREATY arts. 85-93, supra note 5; Case 41/83, Italy v. Commission, 1985 E.C.R.
873; Leigh Hancher, Towards a Free Market for Energy? A Legal Perspective, ENERGY
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The "Internal Energy Market"9 2 policies are themselves part of a
fundamental policy that, pursuant to the Single European Act of 1986, aims
to harmonize and integrate inter-Union trade.93 Indeed, the SEA and the
subsequent TEU can be seen as an evolution of the Treaties of Rome, which
founded the European Economic Community, seeking an "ever closer union"
among the peoples of the Member States.94 These multilateral agreements
determine to "eliminate the barriers which divide Europe," and "to strengthen
the unity of their economies." 95 Physical, technical, and fiscal barriers to
a free internal market were originally identified by the Commission in a
comprehensive White Paper issued by the EEC in June 1985.96
The Commission's 1988 working document on the Internal Energy
Market was the Community's first attempt to address energy issues stemming
from the single market.97 The working document drew up an inventory of
obstacles to greater integration of the energy market and the scope of the task
ahead. These problems have been specifically noted by European commentators. For example, one commentator has stated, "In the EC ...intra-Union
energy trade is not so well-developed, -obstacles have been traditionally of a
different order. Markets have been compartmentalized by the operation of
national or at least regional - whether public or privately owned
monopolies." 98
The European energy market is extremely diverse in terms of products
as well as end-uses. Coal is not subject to much intra-community trade,
while oil enjoys significant competition. However, there are concerns about

POL'Y, Apr. 1990, at 233, 240-42. EC Treaty Article 86 prohibits abuse of a dominant
position within the Common Market or in a substantial part of it when trade between Member

States is affected. "Such abuse may ... consist in ...directly or indirectly imposing unfair
purchase or selling prices or unfair trading conditions ...or applying dissimilar conditions
to equivalent transactions with other trading parties, thereby placing them at a competitive
disadvantage." EC TREATY art. 86(a)-(c), supra note 5.
92. See generally The Internal Energy Market: First Progress Report, COM(90)124 final.
93. E.C. BULL. no. 2, at 5 & Suppl. 2/86 (1986). In accordance with the requirements
of British law, the European Communities Act of 1986 gives the SEA internal effect in the
United Kingdom. See generally GORDON SLYNN, INTRODUCING A EUROPEAN LEGAL ORDER
(Hamlyn Lectures, 43rd ser., 1992).
94. EC TREATY pmbl., supra note 5.
95. Id. Article 2 sets out the Treaty's broad integration objective: "The Community shall
have as its task.., economic and social cohesion and solidarity among Member States." Id.
art. 2.
96. Completing the Internal Market, supra note 79. Its ambits may be concurrently
promoted through secondary legislation under, inter alia, EC TREATY articles 100a(4) & 213,
and to a lesser extent article 90(3), supra note 5.
97. The Internal Energy Market, supra note 80. For example, this working document
seeks "decompartmentalization of the national gas markets." Id. at 66.
98. Leigh Hancher & Alastair Lucas, International Supervision of State and Private
Organizationof Energy Trade, in ENERGY LAW '90: CHANGING ENERGY MARKETS - THE
LEGAL CONSEQUENCES 196 (Int'l Bar Ass'n ed., 1990).
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electricity and gas production, as well as their sophisticated network
infrastructure, which has mainly developed on a national basis. Both of these
energy industries are capital-intensive, therefore the allocation of capital
resources should be made efficiently and must take precedence as a policy
objective. Once the electricity and gas markets become more efficient,
integrated, and competitive, they will produce a positive effect on the
industries' structures.99 This should encourage new entrants, diversity of
fuels and technologies, more freedom of fuel choice, and reduced disparities
between Member States. 1°0
Increased crossborder demand will probably boost trade in gas and
electricity between Member States. However, unless transmission infrastructures and interconnections are developed quickly, supply may be unable to
respond to this increased demand. This is particularly true of countries not
yet connected to the European network, namely the United Kingdom, Ireland,
Spain, Portugal; and Greece.101 The Commission has proposed a package
to foster this development, including a Community action program and a
Consultative Committee, comprised of professional and consumer representatives to aid the Commission.'0 2 However, standardization is essential.
"'The single Community market will become a reality for European industry
only in so far as common technical standards can be developed progressively
'' 0 3
at European rather than national level[s].
Petroleum products, electricity, and gas are to be standardized."° In
particular, a European definition of "reference gases" is being made that
concerns nominal, equipment supply conditions and "limit gases," referring
to extreme variations in gas characteristics.10 5

99. Proposal for a Council Directive Concerning Common Rules for the Internal Market
in Electricity [and] Natural Gas, COM(91)548 final at 3 [hereinafter 1992 Proposal for
Common Rules].
100. Id.
101. The House of Commons Energy Committee concluded: "We are surprised that no
comprehensive examination of the peculiarities and cost benefits of constructing a link with
the European gas grid has been made known to us. We are persuaded that a fully competitive
gas market cannot exist in Britain without such a link." HOUSE OF COMMONs, ENERGY
COMMITTEE, SECOND REPORT, Industrial and Commercial Gas Prices, Session 1989/90,
London:HMSO, Jan. 24, 1990, at xxix.
102. Achevement du Marche Interieur du Gaz et de L'Electicit& Communication to
Commission of the European Communities, COM(91)298, Texte E § 5.2, at 7 [hereinafter
Achevement du Gaz et de L'Electricitd]. Because this document met with much opposition
from Member States, the Commission decided to implement third-party access in three stages.
See Completion of the Internal Market for Electricity and Gas, Orientations for a Phased
Approach Final version Oct. 23, 1991.
103. Achevement du Gaz et de L'Electicit6, supra note 102, § 5.3, at 7 (quoting
Commission Green Paper on the Development of European Standardization, Jan. 28, 1991).
104. Id.
105. Id.
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Removing the barriers to intra-Community trade requires a legal regime
where electricity and gas can move "within and between Member States in
response to demand."' 0 6 This will require changing many existing national
regulations concerning production, imports, exports, transmission, and
distribution.'0 7 By implication, the completion of the internal market might
benefit environmental protection through greater efficiency and adoption of
"cleaner" technologies.'0 8
Reducing CO 2 emissions into the atmosphere has been targeted, with the
resolution having been made at the combined Energy/Environment Council
of October 1990 to stabilize total Community CO 2 emissions at 1990 levels
European Community energy efficiency programs
by the year 2000."°
were ameliorated during the May 31, 1991 Council of Energy Ministers
meeting. However, the Energy Ministers could not agree on the details
needed to enhance the Community's ability to deal with oil crises."0
While the Community is making some progress, advances in a comprehensive energy policy probably will not be achieved within the next few years.
Harmonization is facilitated by Article 8a of the SEA, whereby Member
States amended the three founding Treaties of the European ComArticle 8A(2) states, "The internal market shall comprise an
munities.'
area without internal frontiers in which the free movement of goods, persons,
services and capital is ensured in accordance with the provisions of this
Treaty."' 1 2 Clearly, this multilateral treaty affects the constitutional law of
all the Member States. It encourages greater collective action in the
Community and it will determine3 the ability of Member States to influence
future Community law making.'
Indeed, the most significant institutional change, a cooperation procedure,
concerns decision-making in the Community. It affects certain categories of

106. Id.§ 2.1.1, at 3.
107. Id.
108. Id. § 2.2., at 3.
109. Id.
110. Community energy efficiency programs include the Community Action Program for
Improving the Efficiency of Electricity Use (PACE) and Specific Actions for Vigorous Energy
Efficiency (SAVE). See Council Decision 91/565 of 29 October 1991 Concerning the
Promotion of Energy Efficiency in the Community (SAVE Programme), 1991 O.J. (L307) 3436; Proposal for a Council Decision Concerning the Promotion of Energy Efficiency in the
Community, COM(90)365 final at 13; Council Decision 89/364, 1989 O.J. (L 157) 32, 33.
111. SEA art. 8a(2).
112. Id.
113. Implications of the SEA have been canvassed in the United Kingdom. See, e.g., H.L.
149 (1985-86); H.C. 400 (1985-86); FOREIGN AFFAIRS COMM., THIRD REP., The Single
European Act, H.C. 442 (1985-86); FOREIGN AFFAIRS COMM., THIRD REP., The Single
European Act (Observations by the Gov't), 1985-86, CMND 9858; SELECT COMM. ON
EUROPEAN LEGISLATION, FIRST SPEC. REP., The Single European Act & Parliamentary
Scrutiny, H.C. 264 (1985-86).

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/fjil/vol10/iss1/6

14

1995]

Black: European Law and Public Utility Open Access
EUROPEAN LAW AND PUBLIC UTILITY

Community legislation, increasing the influence of the European Parliament
and the Commission, although ultimate power remains with the Council of
Ministers. A qualified majority vote by the Council adopts most measures
concerning the establishment and functioning of the internal market, pursuant
to article 100a and thereby effectively preventing vetoing by a Member
State.'
It is the principal mechanism for facilitating agreement on the
Single Energy Market. The practice of unanimous voting has been a major
institutional obstacle to policy and budgetary progress.
Nevertheless, taxation and employment require unanimous voting.
Article 189 of the EC Treaty provides a co-operation procedure whereby the
European Parliament enjoys a greater ability to participate in the legislative
process. 15 It must be consulted on initiatives made by the Executive
Council, and it may propose amendments. 1 6 Institutional changes have
been effected in other areas, namely, the official recognition of the European
Council (Heads of State or Government of the Member States meeting from
time to time), but it is not given any specific powers or functions." 7
F. The Internal Marketfor Natural Gas
This section will identify structural characteristics of the Single Energy
Market, security of supply, and environmental concerns. The emphasis is on
policy coordination between trading partners, including regulatory authorities
in different jurisdictions which are connected to a common grid. Such policy
coordination is necessary to commercially foster a single regional gas market.
In September 1986, The Energy Council unanimously adopted energy
policy objectives for 1995.118 The Council's resolution recognized the
diversity of national resources, needs, and policies with respect to energy,
and called upon Member States to achieve individualized general and specific
objectives for 1995.'"
Subsequently, these goals were expressed in a
directive entitled "The Internal Energy Market." The directive seeks greater
integration, free from barriers to trade, of the internal energy market with a
view to improving security of supply, reducing costs, and improving

114. EC TREATY art. 100a, supra note 5. The extent to which the Luxembourg
Compromise will affect the new areas of majority voting remains to be seen. See generally

A

SINGLE EUROPEAN MARKET IN ENERGY

(Royal Inst. Int'l Affairs & Science Pol'y Res.

United, London, 1989).
115. EC TREATY art. 189(b), supra note 5.
116. Id. art. 189b(2).
117. See id.
118. Council Resolution Concerning New Community Energy Policy Objectives for 1995
and Convergence of the Policies of the Member States, 1986 O.J. (C 241) 1.
119. See generally TERENCE DAINTITH & LEIGH HANCHER, ENERGY STRATEGY IN EUROPE:
THE LEGAL FRAMEWORK (1986).
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economic competitiveness.1 20 A community-wide dimension will gradually
complement national programs for security of supply. The Commission has
made tentative proposals concerning security of supply in Member States.
These proposals contemplate the maintenance of aid for a "reserved" sector
121
of energy supply.
In particular, there is clear emphasis on the need to develop an integrated
gas grid and to identify the conditions that are a sine qua non for direct
access. For certain energy products, such as electricity and gas, Member
States or regional entities give exclusive rights for transport and distribution
to both public and private enterprises. It is appropriate to make an inventory
and to examine in what sense these exclusive rights prevent or make more
difficult exchanges between Member States and if such a situation is
compatible with the rules of the EC Treaty, particularly Articles 30 through
37. 122 More specifically, even though the transport domain and the
distribution of both electricity and gas have characteristics that set them
apart, a major problem remains: How to encourage the free transit of natural
gas and electricity inside the Community, yet still have a high level of
security of supply and conditions of transport on an economic basis. This
would permit a transport or distribution company to have direct access to a
resource and show under what conditions this direct access could be extended
to a large industrial consumer. Both these options imply there is a possibility
that third parties could have access, on payment of a reasonable tariff, to
123
existing transport networks.
In November 1988, the Council agreed with the overall recommendations
of the Commission in an "Internal Energy Market" report.2" An important
issue involves security of supply and the strategic nature of energy. 2 ' This
should not result in a watering-down of the diversification objective. It also
should not prevent the goal of limiting net imports of oil and petroleum

120. The Internal Energy Market, supra note 80, at 2. The document identifies two
problems: how to encourage free transit of natural gas, which would permit a distribution
company to have direct access to a resource; and under what conditions direct access to a
resource might be extended to a large industrial customer. Id. at 21.
121. Internal Energy Market and Energy Policy, SEC(90)1248 final.
122. See EC TREATY arts. 30-37, supra note 5. Articles 30 through 36 forbid tariffs,
quotas, and other quantitative restrictions on intra-Union trade. Id. arts. 30-36. Article 37
controls the conduct of commercial State monopolies, especially those that have exclusive
trade and transport rights. Id. art. 37. Under authority of Article 37, the Commission
commenced proceedings both to break up gas and electricity monopolies and to stop Member
States from maintaining exclusive rights to import and export gas and electricity. Andrew
Hill, COMMISSION SETS SIGHTS ON ELECTRICITY AND GAS MONOPOLIES, FIN. TIMES, Sept.
25, 1991.
123. The Internal Energy Market, supra note 80, at 21-22.
124. Council of EC General Secretariat 8954/88 (Presse 163).
125. The Internal Energy Market, supra note 80, at 7.
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products relative to approximately one-third of total energy consumption."'
The Commission also reported that the European energy market is
relatively partitioned, being characterized by diverse products, services,
market participants, and regimes in Member States. 127 Like the economy
in general, the energy market is in a state of flux and possesses its own
distinct characteristics.
G.

Market Structure and Disparities

Structurally, the gas industry differs among the respective Member States
of the European Union. According to some commentators, the structure of
a utility is important because it is a primary determinant of conduct. 128 For
instance, vertical integration dominates in France and the United Kingdom,
neither of which has "independent" local distributors. The spectrum of
possible vertical integration is different in Germany or, a fortiori, the United
States or Canada where local distribution companies add another contractual
and administrative dimension. According to independent observers, the
institutional features of the West European gas markets have tended to
restrain development. 29 The major gas exporting organizations are
characterized by monopoly, large resource rents, and state ownership, all of
which contribute to organizational slack. A different structure could probably
lower gas costs.1 3
The number of European suppliers is comparatively limited, largely
consisting of nationalized corporations with government controlled marketing
operations.'
Thus, to prevent monopoly windfall profits, any restructuring
of the European gas industry requires regulation of the industry's generation,
transmission, and distribution components. "Any system of integration
proposed for the opening of the EEC's natural gas market must account for
particular characteristics of the already-existing European market structures
and the precarious nature of limited indigenous supply networks.' 32

126. Id. at 7-8.
127. Id. at 4-5.
128. Dieter Helm & George Yarrow, The Assessment: The Regulation of Utilities, 4
OXFORD REV. OF ECON. POL'Y, at vii (1988).
129. Marian Radetzki, OPEC REV., Summer 1990, at 185, 199.
130. Id.
131. European producer cartels could be broken up, but a fortiori competition among the
major importer-exporter countries, that is, Russia, the Netherlands, Algeria, and Norway would
increase. Thus, wellhead competition seems to be the aspect of gas pipeline business that
most closely resembles a workable market. US Open Access - Is It a Modelfor Europe, 196
GAS WORLD 10 [hereinafter US Open Access].
132. Ernst-Joachim Mestmacker, Natural Gas in the European Internal Market: A
Comparative Analysis of Common Carriage and Price Transparency, I1 MICH. J. INT'L L.
691, 767 (1990); see Daniel Dreyfus & Annette Koklauner, Open Access to Natural Gas
Pipeline Transportationin North America: Lessonsfor the EuropeanInternalEnergy Market,
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European natural gas production is concentrated in the Netherlands and
the United Kingdom, although the latter has no pipeline interlink with the
continent. 33 A British gas pipeline will soon link Northern Ireland with
Britain, but successful integration with the European market requires
improved interconnections.1 34 Linkage of Britain to Continental Europe is
plausible, but requires an industry-wide attitude change and coordination of
energy policies. 35 Commentators suggest that in theory the Member States
of the EC were obliged to coordinate their energy policies and to work
towards the common energy objectives stipulated in various EC Council
resolutions. However, in practice divergence remained. Consequently, today
the European energy market is as fragmented and partitioned as its North
American counterpart, where there has been little attempt to synchronize
energy policies. 36 However, the pace of commercial integration in the
North American gas grid is arguably increasing and is being complimented
by better coordination between the principal regulatory authorities in the
United States and Canada.
H. North American Direct Sale Paradigm
Although the regulatory superstructure is nascent, European commercial
exigencies are an important force behind restructuring initiatives. Depending
on the statistical model used, demand for gas is expected to rise from the
present level of 225 billion cubic meters (bcm) per year to about 330-350
bcm per year by 2010. To some extent, increased consumption is driving the
move toward common carriage. This includes the increasing use of gas for

3 ENERGY STuD. REv. 277, 285 (1991).
Assurance of reliability must be provided both to government, as the guardian of the
public interest, and to investors who must evaluate the risk of dependence upon the
system . . . . Doubts concerning the risk of deliverability failures or shortageinduced price spikes are also evident in the [North American] market for gas, the
electric power generation market, is currently confounded by the skepticism of
investors in new electric power generating capacity concerning the long-term
reliability of gas as a generating fuel option. The inability to develop convenient
long-term contracts for gas to serve new investments indicates that both users and
suppliers are today unable to evaluate risk adequately to accommodate ordinary
business transactions.

Id.
133. Achevement du Gaz et de L'Electiciti, supra note 102, at 20.
134. Id.
135. Where Britain Leads Europe Could Follow, OFGAS Press Release, May 21, 1992, at
1. OFGAS Director General Sir James McKinnon, citing the British, said, "Britain's gas
industry has in the last five years learnt a valuable lesson that others in Europe would do well
to heed." He was bullish on the possibility of a link to the European gas grid, provided there
was a "change of heart in Continental Europe to optimize the benefit of such a link." Id.
136. Hancher & Lucas, supra note 98, at 166.
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the generation of electricity. In 1975, the Council promulgated a directive
limiting the use of natural gas to generating electricity. Subsequently, in
1989, Member States questioned and repealed the 1973 energy crisis-induced
directive 3 7 because it had become an inefficient allocator of resources.
Industrial demand for gas is increasing along with an appetite for direct,
interruptible sales at discount prices. Whether producers are amenable to
direct sales is another matter. Structurally, the European gas industry is an
oligopoly compared to the hundreds of small producers who exist in Canada
alongside the major players. European skeptics suggest that "[i]ncorrect
conclusions or intervention ... can ... endanger the reliability of gas
supplies and the integrity of gas pricing, as the painful experiences made in
a number of countries have taught.' 138 Others argue that the status of
transmission companies should be preserved or even strengthened in order to
balance the oligopoly of gas suppliers, thereby preventing the fragmentation
of purchase power during potential supply difficulties.'39
The gas industry also fears unnecessary "creeping regulation," arguing
that it benefits attorneys, while hurting the consumer.140 For example, a
sixty-eight page report prepared by Boston's Jensen Associates, Inc. for
Germany's Ruhrgas questioned the suitability of the United States open
access system as a model for Europe, citing vastly different gas markets. 4 '
The report criticized the United States executive branch for usurping state,
congressional, or42judicial prerogatives and failing to implement a comprehensive gas policy.
I.

Security of Supply

During the cold war, security of supply concerns centering on imports
from non-Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD)
countries fettered the interconnection of the European gas grid. These
concerns came to the fore in the early 1980s following the additional
purchase of Soviet Siberian gas supplies. At that time, security of supply
137. SEC(89)754 final at 2. Article 1,IN 2-4 are particularly noteworthy. The
Commission formerly declined to make a final decision on the directive, allowing derogation
by Member States.
138. Burckhard Bergmann, Gas Market Structures in Western Europe, Presented at the
Offshore Northern Seas Conference and Exhibition 10 (Aug. 24, 1988) (transcript on file with
author). See generally JONATHAN P. STERN, EUROPEAN GAS MARKETS: CHALLENGE AND
OPPORTUNITY IN THE 1990S (1990).

139. Nick White, Opinion: Third Party Access to Gas Pipelines, 7 OIL & GAS L. &
TAX'N REv. 191, 193 (1990).
140. Comtec-Gaz Comments on the Proposed Council Directive on the Transit of Gas
Through Major Systems, Presented at the Hearing of the Comm. for Energy, Res. & Tech, of
the European Parliament in Brussels, Apr. 18, 1990.
141. US Open Access, supra note 131, at 10.
142. Id.
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discussions took place within the umbrella of the OECD at the International
Energy Agency (LEA), an oil purchasing cartel, in an attempt to counteract
the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC). Subsequently,
the European Commission became more active." 3 Today, the free market
and energy security aims of the IEA create tensions which are rightfully
accentuated by environmental concerns.
For example, the Commission allows different standards in a particular
range for pollutants such as lead in gasoline or sulphur in gas oil. This begs
the question of whether Member States with stringent standards will have to
market products with less stringent standards. For instance, the Netherlands
wanted tax incentives for cars approximating United States emission
standards despite the opposition of France, Italy, and Great Britain (nations
with large automobile industries). While the EU eventually adopted the
Dutch proposals, the incident highlighted the desirability of Member States
adopting higher environmental standards which could slow the overall
harmonization of European environmental standards.'" Hence, a wide
range of environmental concerns affecting liberalization of the gas market
and security of supply arose.
Most Single Energy Market discussions have focused on increasing
contractual flexibility by abolishing exclusive import and export rights. 4 '
Not surprisingly, European gas transmission companies want to preserve their
strategic position as natural, artificial, legal, or economic monopolies. They
use the "opaque concept" of security of supply as a shield from market
forces. 1 6 Interest group opponents of liberalization make assumptions to
bolster their specious arguments for preserving a closed gas transmission
47
system.

143. See, e.g., Communication from the Commission to the Council on Natural Gas,
COM(86)518 final; Communication from the Commission to the Council Concerning Natural
Gas, COM(84)583 final; Communication from the Commission to the Council Concerning
Natural Gas, COM(84)120 final; J.G. van der Linde & R. Lefeber, InternationalEnergy

Agency Captures the Development of European Community Energy Law, 22 (5) J. WORLD
TRADE 5, 25 (1988).
144. A SINGLE EUROPEAN MARKET IN ENERGY, supra note 114, at 55.

145. The Internal Energy Market, supra note 80, at 66, 88.
146. Thomas W. Waelde, Liberalization of EC Gas Transportation: A Critical Review of
Legal & Policy Arguments Driving the Discussion on Third Part Access, Comment at
Symposium on European Energy Policy for Natural Gas in the Internal Market 10 (Dec. 6,
1991 Salzburg) (transcript on file with author).
147. See Peter L. Kahn, The Politics of Unregulation: Public Choice and Limits on
Government, 75 CORNELL L. REv. 280, 304 (1990). Kahn notes,
In effect, each market failure develops a constituency that benefits from the
continued existence of the market failure, and that therefore has an incentive to
oppose a governmental remedy. Members of cartels, or monopolists generally,
prefer market failure to efficient but competitive rates of return because the market
failure is the source of their monopoly profits. Similarly, the failure of the courts
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These opponents imply that: (1) Direct sales favor and strengthen
external gas producers and encourage free-riders, who do not contribute
equitably to fixed costs yet unfairly benefit from new facilities; (2) "system"
gas encourages the capital investment to develop facilities, and; (3) energy
policy should remain the domain of Member States and the proposals eschew
proportionality. However, since future economic policy is unpredictable, the
Community requires "legitimate leeway" or discretion in its economic and
political judgement in deciding what measures are proportional in achieving
its objectives. 4
Furthermore, supplies will move towards money as previous threats to
supply indicate that market forces are likely to supply those willing to place
a greater value on the commodity. 149 Pipeline financing can be accommodated by a transition cost procedure. For example, in Canada, following
re-negotiation of onerous take-or-pay provisions, the Topgas refinancing
arrangement effectively protected the not-yet-amortized investment of parties
to these imprudent long-term contracts. 50 Accordingly, EU restructuring
of natural
gas transportation is an evolutionary process whose time has
1
come.

15

J.

The European Energy Charter

Long-term EU cooperation in energy is based upon the European Energy
Charter, a declaration signed on December 17, 1991 by delegates from fortyone countries and the European Community.'52 The Charter reflects the
Union's desire to build on the energy relationships between the EU, the
former USSR, and the countries of Eastern Europe. The framework elicits
a more stable energy supply by stressing the energy interdependence of the
Member States, increasing awareness of and responsibility for the environment, and promoting the expansion of trade. Although somewhat weak from

to assign liability for external costs to the appropriate party, or to assign property
rights completely, is likely to call forth the opposition of that party to legislative
correction of the error.
Id. (citation omitted).
148. Waelde, supra note 146, at 20.
149. Id. at 13-14.
150. See Alexander J. Black, Canadian Natural Gas Deregulation: Contractual
Impediments and DiscriminatoryConsequences, 7 J. ENERGY & NAT. RESOURCES L. 42, 5758 (1989).
151. Waelde, supra note 146, at 11-14. Waelde cites the "1973 Mideast oil embargo or
perhaps the 1991/92 dispute between Ruhrgas and Wintershall about supplying parts of
Eastern Germany with Russian gas" as examples of the necessity of restructuring Community
natural gas transportation. Id. at 13 n.29.
152. See generally Communication from the Commission on the European Energy Charter,
COM(91)36 final; 3/91 Conference Annex.
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a legal point of view, this framework favors coordination of diverse interests
over the ad hoc basis of concluding exploration and production arrangements,
which suits Big Oil.
Although not legally binding,'5 3 the European Energy Charter aims to
be a code of conduct progressively manifested via a series of more specific
binding agreements or protocols. "The signatories undertake to pursue the
objectives and principles of the Charter and implement and broaden their
cooperation as much as possible by negotiating in good faith a Basic
Agreement and Protocols."'' " Each protocol will relate to a specific type
of cooperation, naming the participating countries and their respective
commitments, stating budget details, and defining available resources.
International agreements already envisaged include nuclear energy and related
safety improvements, mining and clean coal technology, efficient and rational
use of energy, development of renewable energy resources, and use of natural
gas and its transmission by high-pressure gas pipelines. The Hydrocarbons
Protocol covers licensing for designated areas, development and unitization
plans, rules pertaining to the construction and operation of oil and gas
systems, and matters relating to technology transfer, training, and dispute
55
resolution.1
The Energy Charter's declarations concerning access to energy resources
and ownership and operation of the energy sector are required to be
transparent and non-discriminating. Investments must be protected in
accordance with international law. In the energy sector, these investments
are often heavy and extended over a long period. The right to repatriate

153. Waelde asks,
What will be the status of the European Energy Charter in European
Community law? Will it be simply an internationalfl treaty binding the signatories
or could one derive from the Charter principles of interpretation for European []
energy []law and eventually constitute an element of European energy law? We
would assume the latter.
Waelde, supra note 146, at 15 n.33.
154. THE EUROPEAN ENERGY CHARTER, Title III Com (91) 36 final (1991). The European
Parliament voted in Strasbourg on February 18, 1997 to approve EC ratification of the
European Energy Charter. However, most MEPs voiced misgivings about what they saw as
weaknesses in the agreement intended to offer a framework for east-west trade in primary
energy sources, investment, and technology transfer in the energy sector. See generally MEPs
Ratify Energy Charter,EC ENERGY MONTHLY, Feb. 21, 1997. Earlier, Officials from Energy
Directorate DGXVII and the Central and Eastern European Countries (CEECs) met in
Slovakia to discuss transborder cooperation in the natural gas sector. The topic is high on the
Commission agenda as the EU seeks to foster diverse, secure energy supplies and promote
energy sector cooperation in Europe within the context of the European Energy Charter
Treaty. See generally DGXVII Backs Gas Interconnection with Centraland Eastern Europe,
EC ENERGY MONTHLY, May 20, 1996.

155. Peter Cameron, The European Energy Charter:A Magna Cartafor Energy?, 9 OIL
& GAS L. & TAX'N REv. 207 (1991).
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profits and to gain or use the necessary convertible currency must be
guaranteed. Another Energy Charter objective is to stimulate the energy
trade in Europe by expanding the main transmission grids, interconnecting
the grids, removing the barriers to trade, enforcing the right of transit, and
promoting international trade.
Mutual recognition of technical specifications and rules must be
implemented to achieve European harmonization. These specifications and
rules must protect public health, the environment, and the interests of
consumers and workers. Research, development, and innovation must be
encouraged by the exchange of technological information, participation in
joint research and development actions, and cooperation in the application of
emerging technologies. Implementation of the Energy Charter could be
effected by an annual EU Ministerial Conference. An arbitration board, and
possibly a secretariat, may be needed to settle any disputes on interpretation
of the agreements implementing the Energy Charter.
The international conference to draw up the European Energy Charter
was convened during July 1991. Member States of the European Free Trade
Association and the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development 1 6 were invited to participate in negotiations. The negotiations on the
Charter were completed and in December 1991, it was signed at a ministerial
conference in The Hague. 5 7 Energy sector cooperation between West,
Central, and Eastern European countries, and the former Soviet Union, now
known as the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS),' 58 offers speedy
and tangible economic prospects compared with progress in other sectors.
Western capital, technology, and know-how is intended to elicit secure
petroleum supplies from non-OPEC sources. The Gulf War acted as a
catalyst to the initiative that was launched by the Dutch Prime Minister,
Rudd Lubbers, at a European Council Summit meeting in Dublin on June15 925,
1990. The Soviet Union's breakup only served to accelerate the pace.
Two particularly important objectives were identified in the second
plenary session. State sovereignty and sovereign rights over resources were
included in the final document but provisions concerning national sovereignty
over the management of resources were not. Certain resource rich countries
like Norway encouraged the omission by reserving their position, citing a
conflict between the non-discrimination provision and existing international
156. These countries include: the United States, the United Kingdom, Japan, France,
Germany, Italy, and Canada.
157. Waelde, supra note 146, at 10.
158. This "jurisdiction" possesses 38% of world gas and 6% of world oil reserves. NRC
HANDELSBLAD, (21.09.90) SOURCE: BP STATISTICAL REVIEW OF WORLD ENERGY (British
Petroleum 1990).
159. Michel Chatelin & Marc van Beuge, The EuropeanEnergy Charter, 37 RESOURCES
7, 8 (1992).
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obligations."6 Secondly, the principle of non-discrimination should be
defined in the least restrictive manner which can be achieved. In this respect,
the most-favored-nation treatment, which might be envisaged as a first stage,
should be considered only as a minimum requirement. It would be preferable
to seek a more ambitious and open definition of this concept in the Energy
Charter, closer to national treatment. In both cases, it would be necessary to
take account of any specific legal or other difficulties for certain countries,
while recognizing that the Energy Charter should not necessarily codify the
6
existing situation but should be considered in an evolving context.' '
A "minimum standard" of most favored nation treatment is expressed in
the Energy Charter text and national treatment may be agreed to in provisions
of the Basic Agreement or Protocols. However, the United States has
criticized the non-discrimination definition as going beyond national
treatment so that investments will be ensured "the better of national or Most
Favored National Treatment."' 62
Promotion and protection of investments is one of the fields of action to
implement the Energy Charter's objectives. Arguably, it is the most vital.
The Charter implicitly acknowledges the inefficiency and inadequacy of the
energy transport infrastructure in the Central and Eastern European countries
and CIS. As was the case in Alaska, the climatic conditions where much of
the Russian Siberian gas is located will demand huge investments. While
enhanced energy trade between the CIS and European consumers will
hopefully lower commodity prices, the Energy Charter's attempt to create
63
legal security must wrestle with the political instability in the CIS.1
Unfortunately, the European Energy Charter is not an energy policy
panacea, mainly because there are many different agendas driving policy.
These agendas include traditional energy issues as well as long-term
environmental concerns which seem destined to lose out to short-term Single
European Market concerns. The European Energy Charter does not make an
essential strategic commitment to long-term reduction of demand, although
it will deter signatories from expropriation of energy industries. This
agreement to agree on specific matters is a laudable first step, but it is
wrapped up with the demise of the energy crisis mentality which ended with
the 1986 world drop in oil prices. That is to say, energy policies still focus
on security of supply. Reduction of demand remains a nascent and adjunct
energy policy concern. Reduction of demand is a theoretical form of energy

160. Id. at 10.
161. Summary note of the second plenary session of the Conference: 20/91 Conf. 12.;
Chatelin & van Beuge, supra note 159, at 9.
162. Chatelin & van Beuge, supra note 159, at 9 (citing Per John Tuck, U.S. UnderSecretary of Energy) (citation omitted).
163. Chatelin & van Beuge, supra note 159, at 11.
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supply which deserves greater attention because it promotes environmental
objectives by conserving natural resources.
K.

European Union Environmental Provisions

Environmental provisions concerning Community energy policy are
scarce, so reference must be made to general EU law."6 Pursuant to
Article 130r(1), EU actions affecting the environment must meet the
objective, inter alia, to ensure a "prudent and rational utilization of natural
resources."1 65
Article 130r(2) states that "[e]nvironmental protection
requirements must be [a component] ...
of the Community's other
policies."' 66 Article 130r(3) states that
in preparing its policy on the environment, the Community shall take
account of:
- available scientific and technical data;
- environmental conditions in the various regions of the Community;
- the potential benefits and costs of action or lack of action;
- the economic and social development of the Community
as a
67
whole and the balanced development of its regions.1
Like EC Treaty Articles 8a and 100a, which promote the approximation
or harmonization of national laws that otherwise would create obstacles to
free trade, Article 130r contains multidimensional framework provisions.
These provisions are unlike the straightforward and one-dimensional
provisions of classic Community law, such as found in Article 34(1) on
quantitative measures and measures having equivalent effect. "There is no
absolute frame of reference ...[and] Community law is now about to enter

164. LUDWIG KRAMER, EEC TREATY AND ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION 22 (1992).
Kramer contends,
Specific Community measures to integrate environmental considerations into energy
policy are lacking .... The Community has restricted its activity in the energy
sector almost exclusively to general Decisions and recommendations on energy
saving in particular. The Directive adopted in 1988 on the limitation of emissions
to the atmosphere from combustion installations with a rated capacity from 50
megawatts, provides in the case of existing plant for progressive reductions in
emissions of SO2 by the year 2003 and of NO 2 by 1988. It also specifies limit
values for new plant.
Id. See generally Leigh Hancher, Energy and the Environment: Striking a Balance?, 26
COMMON MKT. L. REv. 475, 475-512 (1989) (discussing the need to reconcile energy and
environmental objectives).
165. EC TREATY art. 130r(l), supra note 5.
166. Id. art. 130r(2).
167. Id. art. 130r(3).
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into its relativistic age where formulas need to be found which allow the
reconciliation of a multitude of shifting frames of references, each of them
composed of a set of legal objectives of equal importance.', 68 This
relativistic age appears to be the European response to the interdependence
of environmental exigencies and environmental interdependence, which
lawyers in the United States call the Global Era of United States administrative law.1 69
III.

INCREASING FREE ACCESS TO THE EUROPEAN GAS MARKET

A.

European Common CarriageProposals

This part identifies the salient provisions of the Gas Transit Directive and
the proposals for a directive for the common rules needed to operate the
interconnected transmission grid. These legal instruments are critically
examined and contrasted with the natural gas transportation experience in the
United Kingdom, a Member State which leads the Community in third party
carriage competition. While the Community provisions are politically
expedient, they do not appear to be sufficient at law to regulate inter-State
transmission. Thus, the concluding component of this part identifies basic
Community competition law which will arguably be necessary given the
absence of a more powerful regulatory regime.
European natural gas companies stress how they cooperate, but their
economic interests are divergent from the public interest. Spare capacity
exists in European transmission systems because a "small 'club' of major
import actors . . . ha[s] demonstrated willingness to carry gas for each other,
but ... [not for] 'outsiders."" '7
For instance, in 1987, the German
company Ruhrgas refused to carry gas internationally from the Norwegian
Troll/Sleipner fields to Austria.'
European gas companies have

168. Jiargen Grunwald, Opinion: Common Carriage-A Reassuring View From Brussels,
3 OI. & GAS L. & TAX'N REv. 55, 61 (1989-90).
169. Alfred C. Aman, Jr., Administrative Law in a Global Era: Progress, Deregulatory
Change, and the Rise of the Administrative Presidency, 73 CORNELL L. REv. 1101, 1104
(1989).
170. STERN, supra note 138, at 79; see Alexander J. Black, Competition Law and British
Natural Gas Regulation, 13 ENERGY L.J. 359-374 (1992) (comparing the British position);
Ruhrgas Holds Out Against TransporterStatus, WORLD GAS REP., June 19, 1987, at 1, 8;

WORLD GAS REP., Sept. 25, 1987, at 4. The club includes: Ruhrgas (a consortium, 60% of
which consists of Exxon, BP, Shell, and Mobil), Gaz de France, Gasunie, SNAM, Distrigaz,
and, arguably, Enagas. STERN, supra note 138, at 79 n.23. A rare public dispute concerning
EC Treaty Article 86, which prohibits abuse of a dominant position, and Inter-Community gas
carriage involved Germany's Ruhrgas and Bayergas, but the matter was settled before the ECJ
could rule on the applicability of this provision to gas transmission services. Id at 79-80.
171. STERN, supra note 138, at 84 & n.39 (citing Ruhrgas Holds Out Against Transporter
Status, supra note 170, at 1).
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traditionally carried gas for other companies for an agreed price and often
pursuant to ad-hoc arrangements. Transmission grid owners seek more than
the cost of third party carriage, they prefer to buy gas, add value, then resell
the commodity.'72 Despite industry intransigence, the liberal Community
proposals on gas transit will alter the status quo. However, it is not clear
when these changes will manifest themselves into tangible benefits for
consumers.
Presently, there are few gas importers and virtually no gas-to-gas
competition.'73 Community gas markets are shared between the monopolistic utilities/producers/importers by long-term contracts for fifteen or more
years.' 74 These arrangements contain expansive take-or-pay clauses, with
gas prices being determined or indexed with reference to competing fuel
prices.'75 As a result, consumers are unable to choose their supplier. 76
Discrimination is inevitable when a pipeline apportions costs to core
customers 77 (small residential or medium commercial) or noncore customers' (industrial). Any eventual "right of transit" will have to address
transportation toll methodology. The Commission is duly concerned about
energy price transparency, especially off-tariff sales of natural gas to
industrial customers. 7 9 It has found an acceptable level of transparency for
the oil sector. 8
Nevertheless, room exists for improvement in gas sector tariffs. After
detailed discussions with various industry and consumer groups, the
Commission proposed a legal instrument which will hopefully allow it to

172. BURCKHARD BERGMANN, THE ARCHITECTURE OF THE EUROPEAN GAS INDUSTRY
BETWEEN MARKET OPPORTUNITIES AND POLITICAL VARIABILITIES 12 (1988).

173. Achevement du Gaz et de L'Electicit&, supra note 102, at 5.
174. Id.
175. Id.

176. Id.
177. Core customers are customers with no fuel alternatives to natural gas, such as
residential and small commercial customers. These customers traditionally receive gas service
under a "bundled" service of gas supply procurement and transportation service.
178. Noncore customers are customers with alternative fuel capability, such as large
commercial and industrial customers, including power plants and enhanced oil recovery
customers. These customers have the option of purchasing gas from a gas utility's core or
noncore portfolio or choosing to have the gas utility transport their own gas purchases.
179. The Internal Energy Market, supra note 80, at 26-27. Transparency is a Community
term of art concerning the degree to which transportation and commodity rates accurately
reflect their cost, including any cross-subsidization between different classes of customer. See
Commission Directive on Transparency of Financial Relations Between Member States and
Public Undertakings, 1980 O.J. (L 195) 35; Joined Cases 188-190/80, France, Italy & the UK
v. Commission, 1982 E.C.R. 2545.
180. Regarding a Community Procedure for Information and Consultation on the Prices of
Crude Oil and Petroleum Products in the Community, 1976 O.J. (L 140) Council Directive
76/491. There also is a weekly bulletin that is agreed upon by the Member States and the oil
companies.
Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 1995

27

Florida Journal of International Law, Vol. 10, Iss. 1 [1995], Art. 6
FLORIDA JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW

[Vol. 10

obtain the necessary price information for gas prices and for its regular
publication.'
B.

Right of Transit

In July 1989, the Commission made proposals to bring about the free
circulation of gas between Member States by creating a right of transit (droit
de transit). 2 The Gas Transit Directive was approved at the May 1991
Council meeting. 8 3 It is designed to facilitate and maximize gas exchanges
across non-neighbor gas transmission utilities."s This measure followed
approval of the Electricity Transit Directive,8 5 where high voltage transmission utilities are enjoined to provide power exchanges through their grids
unless the arrangement would otherwise affect transmission reliability.
The Gas Transit Directive contemplates the growth in export capacity, as
is the case with Dutch gas to Germany, and French electricity to Germany
and Portugal. It therefore seems reasonable, as a general rule, that allocativeeconomic efficiency creates a need for rights of access to networks." 6
Thus, in Article 5 of the 1989 Communication Draft Directive, the Council
was enjoined to decide the principles and "complementary conditions
governing the detailed rules of Intra-Community transit."'8 7

181. Draft Council Directive Concerning a Community Procedure to Improve the
Transparency of Gas & Electricity Prices Charged to Industrial End-Users, COM(89)332 final.
182, Towards Completion of the Internal Market for Natural Gas: Commission of the
European Communities Proposal for a Council Directive on the Transit of Natural Gas
Through the Major Systems, COM(89)334 [hereinafter 1989 Proposal Directive on the Transit
of Natural Gas] final at 10, as amended by COM(90)425 final at 6.
183. Council Directive 91/296 of 31 May 1991 The Transit of Natural Gas Through Grids
Directive, 1991 O.J. (L 147) 37 [hereinafter Transit of Natural Gas Through Grids Directive].
Waelde stated that "[w]e understand (as of January 1992) that the Commission intends to
encourage other steps to integrate the energy markets before raising again the draft directive
on gas transport liberalization. Reportedly, the Commission therefore intends not to drop, but
to postpone the directive dealing with third-party access." Waelde, supra note 146, at 3 n.9.
184. Transit of Natural Gas Through Grids Directive, supra note 183, at 37-38.
185. 1990 O.J. (L 313) 30.
186. Michael Brothwood & Peter Cameron, Rights of Access to Energy Markets, Delivered
to the Int'l Bar Ass'n, Comm. on Utility Law 2 (Oct. 3, 1989) (specifically citing France's
extra 5% to 8% nuclear-generated electrical power capacity).
187. 1989 Proposal Directive on the Transit of Natural Gas, supra note 182, art. 5, at 4
(Annex). Other salient provisions include:
The conditions of natural gas transit through the gas transmission grids shall be
negotiated and agreed by the bodies responsible for the grids concerned.
Any requests for transit shall, within eight (8) days, be communicated.., to
the Commission and the national competent authorities;
The responsible entities shall be obliged, within a maximum of one month,
to open negotiations on the conditions of the natural gas transit requested;
The transit conditions must be equitable for all the parties concerned and
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On October 29, 1990, after intensive lobbying by interest groups, the
European Community agreed in principle to a "common carriage type
directive." '88 The Community Energy Minister, Mr. Antonio Cardoso e
Cunha, stated that the proposed directive did not commit Europe to a
common carrier system, as in Britain. 8 9 This statement may be indicative
of the final right of transit. While the British system leads Europe, it is quite
impotent in comparison to incidents of common carriage in Canada or the
United States.
Such a radical opening of the market, as is being experienced in North
America, is felt to be too unpopular with most Member States. One reason
is that "[g]as supply, as opposed to gas production, is ... geographically
monopolized and supplier dominated."' 90 The European gas market is
different from the related corporate concentration in Canada and the United

should not include unfair clauses or unjustified restrictions, in particular, payment
for transit must take account of [the transporter's] responsibilities ...for ensuring
security of supply and contractual quality of service;
.... [and]
If, after twelve months following the communication ... negotiations have
not achieved agreement, the Commission and the national authorities will be
informed by the interested parties who have to indicate their reasons.
In the absence of due reasons for the failure to reach an agreement or if the reasons
appear unjustified or insufficient, the Commission, acting on a complaint from the
requesting body or on its own initiative, shall put in hand the procedures provided
for by the Treaty or any other applicable provision of Community law.
Id. arts. 3(1)-4, at 3-4 (Annex).
188. Draft Common Position of the Council Proposal for a Council Directive on the Transit
of Natural Gas through the Major Systems, 10326/90 Annex I. "The conditions of transit
shall, pursuant to the rules of the Treaty, be non-discriminatory and fair for all parties
concerned, shall not include unfair clauses or unjustified restrictions and not endanger security
of supply and quality of service, in particular taking full account of the utilization of reserve
production and storage capacity and the most efficient operation of the existing systems." Id.
art. 3(2), at 6. "The President of the Council noted that a qualified majority within the
Council was in favor of approving the substance of a common position on this proposal as it
stood following the proceedings of the Permanent Representative's Committee and today's
discussions. The Council will be requested to act on the text as finalized by the Permanent
Representative's Committee." Press Release, Oct. 29, 1990.
189. Lucy Kellaway, EC Moves Closer to Single Gas Market, FIN. TIMES, Oct. 30, 1990,
at 3. The political hyperbole has to be recognized. For instance, in an address on September
3, 1992, at a University of Dundee Centre for Mineral Law and Policy-sponsored conference
at St. Andrews, Scotland, Mr. Cardoso e Cunha became a bit carried away saying that "No
other area, not even the United States, has the quality of energy in Europe."
190. Hancher, supra note 1, at 81. In a European context, regulation is arguably less likely
to be used if those affected are small in number and if consensual alternatives such as
negotiation and contracts can be used instead. Terence Daintith, Law as a Policy Instrument:
Comparative Perspective, in LAW AS AN INSTRUMENT OF ECONOMIC POLICY: COMPARATIVE
AND CRITICAL APPROACHES 3, 40-41 (Terence Daintith ed., 1987) [hereinafter LAW AS AN
INSTRUMENT]; Hans D. Jarass, Regulation as an Instrument of Economic Policy, in LAW AS
AN INSTRUMENT, supra, at 86-87.
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States. This perspective partly explains the strategy that the industry is
taking when faced with the market dislocation threat of third party access.
For instance, oil and gas industry spokespersons have remarked on how
the British government has led the way in liberalizing its market for gas.
Ostensibly, these spokespersons agree with European Commission moves to
free the movement of natural gas, to enhance security of supply, and to
increase competition,"' yet they are sophisticated in their public response
to the Gas Transit Directive. As Cornelius Herkstroter aptly stated,
It does seem ...that the Commission's suggested measures,
notably the concepts of unbundling and regulating third party access
to gas pipelines, are out of step with its aims. By imposing
unprecedented restrictions and terms on companies, rather than
encouraging the industry to compete, to build on efficiency and to
invest in further market penetration, the measures run the risk of
actually reducing competition and endangering the security of gas
supply in Europe.
• ..And in common with others, the belief in Shell is that any
EC intervention should uphold those [non-intervention] principles
and not take the backward step of adding unnecessary regulation ...
It will then be important that the UK does not allow its own position
on gas liberalization to be misapplied in the broader market of
Europe through the introduction of over-rigid regulation.'92
Two criticisms can be made concerning this statement. The reasoning
is fallacious in a narrow sense because the United Kingdom, as one Member
of the Community, cannot determine Community policy. It is also spurious
in a broader value-judgment sense. It speciously denies any imperfection or
that new regulatory responses are required to meet the exigencies of a
maturing gas distribution system in Europe.
While the Natural Gas Through Grids Transit Directive may be watered
down following political compromise, it contains the basic building block of
prudent public utility regulation, namely a proviso against discrimination in
93
rates. 1
Article 3(1) states, "Contracts involving transit of natural gas between
grids shall be negotiated between the entities responsible for those grids and
for the quality of service provided and, where appropriate, with the entities
[that is, regulatory authorities,] responsible in the Member States for

191. See generally Transit of Natural Gas Through Grids Directive, supra note 183.
192. HerkstrOter, supra note 76, at 4.
193. Transit of Natural Gas Through Grids Directive, supra note 183, art. 3(2), at 38.

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/fjil/vol10/iss1/6

30

1995]

Black:EUROPEAN
European LA
Law
and Public Utility Open Access
W AND PUBLIC UTILITY

importing and exporting natural gas."' 94
Article 3(2) states, "The conditions of transit shall, pursuant to the rules
of the Treaty, be non-discriminatory and fair for all parties concerned, shall
not include unfair clauses or unjustified restrictions and not endanger security
of supply nor quality of service, in particular taking full account of the
utilization of reserve production95and storage capacity and the most efficient
operation of existing systems."'
Member States are required to take the necessary measures to ensure that
the pipeline companies, for example, act immediately to "notify the
Commission and the national authorities concerning any request for [third
party] transit."' 96 Provision is made for nonbinding conciliation through
the auspices of the European Commission, 9 7 and failing that, Article 4 of
the Gas Transit Directive reserves Community competition powers. and
procedures as the legal mechanism for dispute resolution.'9 8 However, a
question arises whether these competition powers will prove efficacious or
whether the public interest could be better promoted by different means.199
C.

Third Party Access

Internationally, the Commissioners comprise a group appointed by the
Member States to serve as a kind of cabinet for Community affairs. But
under Community rules, the Commissioners can only propose rules, which
must then be confirmed by a Council of National Ministers. Thus, a step-bystep approach was provided, inter alia, for consultation between Member
The consultative procedure aimed "to
States and sectarian interests."

194. Id. art. 3(1), at 38.
195. Id. art. 3(2), at 38.
196. Id. art. 3(3), at 39. Article 3(3) enjoins Member States to compel pipeline companies
to:
- open negotiations on the conditions of the natural gas transit requested;
- inform the Commission and the national authorities concerned of the conclusion
of a transit contract; [and]
- inform the Commission and the national authorities concerned of the reasons for
the failure of the negotiations to result in the conclusion of a contract within twelve
months following communication of the request.

Id.
197. Id. art. 3(4), at 39.
198. Id. art. 4, at 39.
199. The depth of distrust of and opposition to the Commission's proposals for the
completion of the Internal Energy Market and the political clout of major energy companies
was evinced in Brussels at the Meeting of the Energy Council on November 30, 1992. At this
meeting, the Council noted reservations, particularly in regards to general third party access
mechanisms, and indicated that debate on the completion of the Internal Energy Market would
be continued at the next meeting.
200. 1989 Proposal Directive on the Transit of Natural Gas, supra note 182, at 2.
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discuss if third-party access to a European transport system needs to be
organized and, when necessary, under what conditions." '
The Proposal
Directive states,
Third party access (TPA) is a regime providing for an obligation, to
the extent that there is capacity available, on companies operating
transmission and distribution networks for electricity and gas to offer
terms for the use of their grid, in particular to individual consumers
or to distribution companies, in return for.payment.20 2
This initiative is timely, given the impetus towards an integrated market and
the present volume of intra-Community gas trade.2" 3
Common rules will regulate access to common natural gas markets.2"
The draft directives for gas and electricity require Member States to abolish
exclusive rights concerning electricity generation and electricity and gas
transmission lines. 0 5 Additionally, electricity and gas companies are
required to unbundle their accounting procedures to promote nondiscriminatory competition. 206 Furthermore, the draft provisions specifically mention that any state aid granted to one division may not benefit another
division.0 7 This affects the state-controlled, vertically-integrated energy
companies in Greece, France, and Italy. Lastly, electricity and gas companies
must introduce third party access to a finite group of high-volume gas and
electricity consumers.20 8
The principles underlying the proposals concerning the gas sector does
not contemplate a rigid structure at the Community level; instead, they
209
contemplate a gradual approach based on the principle of subsidiarity,

201. Id.
202. 1992 Proposal for Common Rules, supra note 99, at 6.
203. "Every fifth m3 of natural gas produced in a member nation of the European
Communities is exported to another EC country." Bergmann, supra note 138, at 8. Forty
percent of Community gas is imported from non-Community countries. BERGMANN, supra
note 172, at 8.
204. 1992 Proposal for Common Rules, supra note 99, at 3-4, 61.
205. Id. at 5.
206. Id. at 22, 78-79.
207. Id. at 79.
208. Id. at 4-5. See generally A Fair Wind Blows for the Third Party Access Proposals,
EC ENERGY MONTHLY, Feb. 14, 1992 [hereinafter Third Party Access Proposals].
209. See Herkstr6ter, supra note 76, at 3. Herkstroter stated,
Subsidiarity will hopefully put an end to centralized bureaucratic regulation
which defines, to the smallest detail, the way in which things must be done. It
opens the door for sensible regulation that is close to the market and to players in
the market, then puts the onus firmly on those players to do what is required in the
most effective way, and, lastly, judges the outcome.
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which requires that Members States implement measures best suited for their
particular circumstances in order to achieve broadly defined Community
aims. However, the Community principle of proportionality requires the
means employed to be proportionate to the ends sought.2"' The Commission also seeks to "avoid the trap of excessive regulation."2 1' Member
States will be accorded maximum authority to implement specific measures
21 2
and resolve disputes under the principle of minimum required regulation.
Finally, the principle of progressivity recognizes the need for a transition
period to give industry time to adapt to proposed measures.2 13 These
principles will be implemented under a three stage procedure.21 4
A consultant's report that was widely circulated in the industry but never
fully disseminated to the public examined the potential advantages and
drawbacks of Community common carriage. 2 5 The Coopers and Lybrand
Report first recommended establishing a separate body responsible to the
Commission with sufficient delegated powers to effectively police common
carriage, including policing of dominate positions. 216 Second, it recommended the drafting of fair and reasonable transmission guidelines, including

210. COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES, XXTH REPORT ON COMPETITION
POLICY (Luxembourg, 1991 ISBN 92-826-2314-9). The report's introduction states:
Regulated sectors and those in which companies enjoy exclusive rights will have to
be subject to the rules of competition if the internal market is to function properly
...the Commission will apply the rule of proportionality; in deciding whether these
services of a general economic interest can be effectively provided in any other way
than by granting exclusive rights to particular suppliers. Such services of a general
economic interest are usually found for basic utilities (e.g., gas, water, electricity,
telecommunications, etc.) . . . . A further consideration is that many of these
services necessitate a near universal network in each Member State and the
Commission has to see to what extent the principle of open access to the network
can allow competition without prejudicing the provision of the service.
Id.
211. 1992 Proposal for Common Rules, supra note 99, at 8. The principles follow the
approach of Articles 100 and 100c of the EC Treaty, which fosters dialogue between the
Council and the EC Parliament. Id. at 8-9.
212. Id. at 8.
213. Id.
214. Id. at 9.
215. COOPERS & LYBRAND, STUDY ON THE ADVANTAGES AND DRAWBACKS FOR THE
EUROPEAN COMMUNITY OF THE INTRODUCTION OF A SYSTEM OF 'COMMON CARRIER' FOR
THE TRANSPORT OF NATURAL GAS, REPORT TO COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES (C&L Belmont, Jan. 1989) (on file with the FloridaJournal of InternationalLaw).

The study was not a robust defense of open access and ostensibly looked like a systematic
critique. Although the Coopers & Lybrand report was skeptical about the wisdom of
introducing a common carriage system in Europe, it acknowledged the need for additional
regulation to accommodate such a regime. Id. at 12-13. Nonetheless, the Community asked
for a follow-up to quantify potential benefits of open access, assuming the potential could be
realized.
216. Id. at 12.
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the ratio of transmission tariffs to the average cost of the facilities used and
special charges for interruptible service.217 Third, the report suggested
requiring inter-regional gas supply companies to publish development
proposals so as to facilitate third-party capacity requirements.2" 8 By taking
on additional investment costs, inter-regional supply companies would be
obliged to create corresponding capacity.21 9 Finally, the Report recommended developing a measure to prevent abuse of third-party transportation
by the transmission companies.220
The Commission wanted to implement the gas transit, electricity transit,
and price transparency directives that contain the "common rules necessary"
for achieving the second stage. 221 "The Commission ... [hoped to see]
this second stage enter into force 1 January 1993, D-day for the completion
of the internal market. 2 22 The second stage itself has three elements.223
Firstly, it is necessary to create a transparent and nondiscriminatory system for granting licenses for the production of
electricity and the building of electricity lines and gas pipelines.
...Secondly, the concept of unbundling, i.e., separation of the
management and accounting of production, transmission, and
distribution operations, must be put into practice in verticallyintegrated undertakings.
...The final element is the introduction on a limited basis of
third party access (TPA), whereby the transmission and distribution
companies are obliged to offer access to their network to certain
eligible entities at reasonable rates, within
the limits of available
224
transmission and distribution capacity.
Examples of eligible entities include large industrial users whose demand
exceeds a certain threshold and distribution companies, provided that other
22 5
industrial and domestic users benefit indirectly from TPA.
However, the discussions on gas were put on ice in 1994 to await the
conclusions on the implementation of the second stage regarding third-party

217. Id. at 11.
218. Id. at 12.
219. Id.at 11.
220. Id.at 12.
221. 1992 Proposal for Common Rules, supra note 99, at 9-10. The third stage or phase
of third party access was to be implemented on January 1, 1996, upon the Commission's
evaluation of phase two. Id. at 11.
222. Id.at 10.
223. Id.at 9.
224. Id.
225. Id. at 9- 10.
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access to the electricity network.226 It was not until December 1996 that
concrete progress was made in the electricity sector implying that movement
in the gas sector is imminent. The new Electricity Directive establishes
common rules for the production, transmission and distribution of electricity.
It defines detailed rules on the organization and functioning of the electricity
sector, market access, the criteria and procedures that apply to calls for
tender, the granting of licenses, together with the operation of systems.227
The amended proposal for natural gas transit is currently before the Council
for a common position.228
The extent to which national gas grids will be pried open to competition
over the next ten years was salted for discussion by the EU's fifteen Energy
Ministers at their Council meeting in Brussels on May 27, 1997. Two other
issues - take-or-pay gas supply contracts and emergent markets - also
dominated the Ministers' discussions on the all-important Directive on
common rules for the internal market in natural gas, but the amended
proposal is not ripe for an agreement yet. The Council is expected to adopt
a Resolution on the November 1996 Green Paper on renewable energy and
take a look at the Commission's proposal for new gas market opening
options. Most Member States share the opinion that long-term gas supply
contracts with take-or-pay provisions are essential in today's gas market and
will be so in the future. The Minister's discussion will be focused on the
extent to which the Directive should allow for derogations for future take-orpay contracts and on who should take the decision to grant exemptions
(national authorities and/or the Commission).229
D.

Third Party Access Thresholds

The natural gas directive does not pertain to exploration and production.230 Specific Community action to promote competition in this sector
should take place in 1997 following the apparent resolution of the electricity
transit rules. 231 Until the discussion on gas transit were put in abeyance in

226. Commission of the European Communities: Internal Market for Energy; Current
Position and Outlook, July 9, 1996.
227. Commission Opinion on the Internal Market in Electricity: Spicers Centre For
Europe, Dec. 12, 1996, COM(96)710 final.
228. Commission of the European Communities, June 19, 1996, Internal Market for
Energy; Common Rules for the Internal Market in Natural Gas, First reading, 0. J. (C 329)
Dec. 6, 1993; Economic and Social Committee opinion, 0. J. (C 73) Mar. 15, 1993, 0. J. (C
195) July 18, 1994.

229. See generally Energy Council: Ministers to Seek Consensus on Gas Market Opening,
EuRoPEAN REP., May 24, 1997.
230. 1992 Proposal for Common Rules, supra note 99, at 25.
231. The Commission had originally wanted to complete its proposal by the end of 1992.
Id. at 23.
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1994, third party access to the network was begun by progressive adaptation
and use of an interconnected network, and was limited to suitable undertakings such as those benefitting large consumers.232 A threshold 2of
33
twenty-five million m 3 per site has been set for individual companies.
For distribution companies, a threshold of 1% of national gas consumption
has been set, as compared with234
3% of the energy distributed in each Member
State in the case of electricity.
E. European Union Take-or-Pay Obligations
Liberalization of European gas transportation must face the problems
created by long-term supply contracts, which include onerous take-or-pay
provisions. Regrettably, there is neither a regulatory body in the Community
with the power to intervene in contracts between Member States, nor a
provision for the creation of such a "European Energy Commission" under
the terms of the Community treaties.235 In the absence of stronger political
consensus, the provisions of the draft directive on common rules have to be
seen as the next best alternative.
The Commission's draft directive acknowledges that the third party
access regime may induce Member States to rescue gas companies from takeor-pay exposure.236 However, in accordance with Article 24 of the draft
directive on natural gas, this type of state aid will require prior Commission
approval. 237 Take-or-pay obligations involve important sanctity of contract
principles.238 The Directive seeks to protect the economic viability of
existing gas companies while liberalizing the market.239
A take-or-pay clause obligates a purchaser to pay for a percentage, a
prefixed annual volume, of the gas which a seller can produce, whether or

232. Id. at 25.
233. Id. at 26.
234. Id. Phase two for third-party industrial customers limits electricity access to large
companies with yearly consumption of 100 GWh or more (equivalent to 25MW for 4000
hours/yr.). Id. at 18. The Commission estimates that 400-500 large customers will benefit
with the freer market for electricity, as will approximately 100 distributors. Id.
235. Brothwood & Cameron, supra note 186, at 2; see The Internal Energy Market, supra
note 80, 83, at 28. At one time the Commission contemplated the idea of a Community
regulatory authority yet has not raised the possibility that: "The Community's natural gas
industry could, for example, also set up a flexible joint body to deal with carriage and the
administration of the European gas pipeline network, access to which would be open to all
transport companies in the Community." Id.
236. 1992 Proposal for Common Rules, supra note 99, at 28.
237. Id. at 81 (Annex 2).
238. Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Natural Gas Regulation, Deregulation and Contracts, 68 VA.
L. REV. 63, 113 (1982) (holding that "[p]ervasive regulation and contracts do not coexist
well").
239. 1992 Proposal for Common Rules, supra note 99, at 27, 57-58 (Annex 2).
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not the purchaser actually takes the gas.24 ° These risk-sharing arrangements
shift the long-term volume decline risk from the producers to the gas
The clauses were utilized to facilitate capital intensive
companies."'
investment required for constructing the industry infrastructure at a time
when the market was beginning to develop.242 The commodity price is
usually linked or indexed to oil (the main alternative fuel) prices and, since
the price can rise or fall, the risk exists in both directions.24 3 The Commission Proposal envisages that the need for offtake security in the form of takeor-pay provisions will wane in an interconnected European gas market. 2 "
Nevertheless, take-or-pay provisions remain an important factor along
with other price-related provisions. For instance, European gas demand fell
between 1982-84 when gas prices and delivery conditions failed to respond
fast enough to price changes in alternative fuels. Many arrangements were
renegotiated and, subsequently, fuel adjustment clauses increased the
frequency of price and shortened the periods for indexation to about three
months by the end of the 1980s. 245 Following the development of the
Norwegian Troll Field, gas was sold on a netback (net of transportation
costs) market basis. 246 This guaranteed that continental importers would pay
a price commensurate with competing fuel costs, but failed to account for
and transportation costs in relation to prevailing energy pricproduction
2 47
es.
A parallel approach for gas and electricity is relied upon in the gas
While it differs from the Electricity Directive, which 25is0
proposal. 24
249 it also has similarities.
contained in the same Commission document,
of the Commission
These similarities require a conjunctive reading
251
commentary concerning the electricity proposals.
Unfortunately, a palliative to protectionism seems to have been inserted
into the directive as a political compromise. The directive contains a
"safeguard clause ... which allows a Member State, with approval of the

240. Id. at 27.
241. Id.
242. Id.

243. Id.
244. Id.
245. STERN, supra note 138, at 16.
246. Id.
247. Id. In Canada, instead of regulated producer prices, a netback pricing system was
introduced whereby producers received the netback from the marketing arm of TransCanada
Pipelines Ltd. R. HYNDMAN, IMPACT OF NATURAL GAS DEREGULATION IN PRODUCING
PROVINCES: ALBERTA 8 (Alberta Dept. of Energy 1987).
248. 1992 Proposal for Common Rules, supra note 99, at 25.
249. Id. at 25-28.
250. Id. at 17-18, 25-26.
251. Id. at 13.
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Commission, to take the appropriate measures [in times of shortage,] in case
one of its gas companies is faced with economic difficulties because of
existing TOP [take-or-pay] obligations." '52 This rather vague clause
threatens to emasculate the Community controlled third party carriage regime,
and thus Community supply safeguards are needed.2" 3 Inter-Community
gas carriage rates (and related take-or-pay agreements that also contemplate
transportation of the commodity) should be set by the Commission or its
agent, but the directive seems silent in regard to the administrative
mechanism to determine charges, rate rationale, and rates of return.
Although charges should be reasonable, the directive fails to identify the
person responsible for determining this mixed question of law and fact.
F. Uncertain Rate Rationale
European Union rate regulation will only affect competitive (third party
industrial) pricing of electricity or gas. Member States retain their regulatory
powers concerning gas and electricity pricing, including standardized national
prices, for all end-users who are not eligible for TPA.254 Member States
remain free to determine the scope of distribution companies' rights and
public service obligations.2 5
Furthermore, the Commission will not interfere with the right of States
to establish licensing criteria for the generation and transmission of electricity
and gas.25 6 Member States will determine the extent and nature of
distribution companies' rights and public service obligations. 7 Exclusive
distribution rights may be granted as long as grid access is granted to eligible
users, users can buy from another supplier by means of a direct line (this
refers to "bypass"), and the transparency requirements are met.2
Member
States also can set the criteria for granting licenses to construct power
stations, transmission lines, and distribution lines.259
Finally, Member States will be free to choose how they will implement
the directive, including the ability to determine their own regulatory
regimes. 26 While this may be a paean to commercial freedom, it may
simultaneously obfuscate the transparency of market behavior. Indeed, it
may lead to intra-Community regulatory forums that are diverse and possibly

252.
253.
254.
255.
256.
257.
258.
259.
260.

1992 Proposal for Common Rules, supra note 99, at 28.
Third Party Access Proposals,supra note 208.
1992 Proposal for Common Rules, supra note 99, at 10.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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conflict with the inter-Community forum.
The failure of the European Community to set transportation tolls for
inter-Community sales creates a regulatory conundrum. First, in order to
properly regulate third party direct sales, the Commission requires complete
financial, economic, and contractual information regarding both the majority
volumes destined for core customers and the third party volumes.2 6' More
importantly, European gas regulation uses the term "non-discriminatory" with
a connotation that does not fully comprehend the nuances of cross-subsidization between different classes of customers. For instance, bulk
industrial buyers usually receive discounts because of their ability to switch
easily to competing fuels, while captive core residential customers cannot
change so readily.
In contrast to the European Union, Anglo-American law refers to "unjust
discrimination," recognizing the inevitability of some discrepancies between
customer classes. In common law countries, the art of public utility
regulation involves apportioning the burden of a utility's revenue needs
among customer classes. Thus, the EC proposals set a markedly different
jurisdictional competence than in the United States and Canada. Community
Member States will have greater scope than North American nations for
avoiding, and arguably disrupting, central control by characterizing rate issues
as pertaining to core customers. To alleviate this problem, the Community
should assert plenary transportation pricing control over all inter-Community
bound gas. This would be similar to federal interstate and interprovincial
competence in the United States and Canada.
G. Dispute Resolution Procedure
Article 25 of the 1992 Proposal for Common Rules provides that
"Member States shall establish a dispute resolution procedure by which the
parties can settle disputes on matters covered by the directive. ' ' 262 Such a
dispute resolution procedure is uncertain and not binding as it stands. A
fortiori, the draft directive's preamble states, "Whereas, in accordance with
the principle of subsidiarity, general principles providing for a framework
must be established at Community level, but their detailed implementation
should be left to the Member States. 26 3
Furthermore, Article 10 of the Directive provides:
Each transmission company shall prepare and publish an annual
estimate on the demand for gas in its area and on the system

261. Id. at 18-19.
262. Id. art. 25, at 82 (Annex 2).
263. Id. at 60 (Annex 2).
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transmission capability including transfer capabilities to and from
neighboring systems. The estimate shall cover a period of at least 10
years beginning from the year in which it is prepared.26"
Under the subsidiarity principle, Member States will be left to administer
a virtually meaningless reporting requirement.2 65 Since gas demand and
system transmission capability information is required for transparency,
responsible regulation will not be achieved by such an obvious political
compromise made at the expense of the public interest.
Member
Governments will, of course, decide the degree to which the provisions of the
draft Directive become reality.2' 6
Along with industry opposition to the unbundling and transparency
proposals, third party access seems destined to provoke the most opposition.
Initially, the Netherlands and Germany, lobbied by its largest carrier,
Ruhrgas, voted against the proposal to introduce third party access during the
so-called stage one of the Internal Energy Market.267 Conversely, the
United Kingdom was the only Member State firmly in favor of third party
access. Lastly, not a single gas company supported the Gas Transit
Directive. 268 Reaching a common position will thus be a priority. Despite
industry opposition, it is essential that there be competition in generation and
transmission line construction in the Single Market. 269 Third party access
seems inevitable in the European Union, but the timescale and thresholds still
require political negotiation.
Regrettably, a lacuna exists in Community energy law. There is a
marked absence of a real Community energy policy concerning security of
supply. Such a policy is needed to cope with the environmental and free-

264. 1992 Proposal for Common Rules, supra note 99, art. 10, at 69. Earlier drafts were
far more stringent and exacting upon gas companies, proposing obligations to report average
and peak demand, as well as load curves. See, e.g., Achevement du Gaz et de L'Electicit6,
supra note 102, art. 9, at 57 (Annex 2).
265. Article 9(1) of the 1992 Proposal for Common Rules requires transmission companies
to provide other interconnected parties with "sufficient information to ensure the secure and
efficient operation and the coordinated development of the interconnected system." 1992
Proposal for Common Rules, supra note 99, art. 9(1), at 68 (Annex 2).
266. Jonathan Stem, Royal Inst. Int'l Affairs, Third Party Access in European Gas
Industries (Draft Report) 12 (Feb. 12, 1992) (unpublished manuscript, on file with Florida
Journalof InternationalLaw).
267. Third PartyAccess Proposals,supra note 208; see 1992 Proposal for Common Rules,
supra note 99, at 1-18.
268. STERN, supra note 138, at 3. See generally Third PartyAccess Proposals,supra note
208.
269. 1992 Proposal for Common Rules, supra note 99, at 25. See generally Third Party
Access Proposals,supra note 208.
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market pressures that are increasing in the industry.270
H.

Transparency

Price and market transparency are essential requirements for competition
27'
generally and for evaluating costs and prices in the energy industry.
Previously, the Commission acknowledged that there is a trend towards
transparency in gas prices and that "transparency is particularly difficult to
achieve in relation to off-tariff sales to industrial customers."272 Industrial
customers throughout the leading Western countries increasingly employ
dual-fire boilers or generators. Their ability to switch to a competing fuel is
the overriding reason for price discrimination in their favor. Others,
invariably including residential and small commercial customers, cannot
economically switch over to an alternative fuel. Whether such discrimination
is justifiable and fair is a matter of fact to be determined by the relevant
regulatory authority pursuant to its enabling legislation.
A Council directive on price transparency requires that electricity and gas
utilities supply the Community Statistical Office with the rates they charge
to all types of customers. 3 These figures have traditionally been published in the aggregate with a pledge to respect confidentiality. Outsider
scrutiny has thus been inhibited by integrated utility undertakings who
publish their accounts on a consolidated basis. 274 Furthermore, underlying
European contractual relationships for gas "have been shrouded in secrecy to
such an extent that it is difficult to go beyond a description of underlying
principles., 275 The directive, however, requires companies to keep separate
accounts for each of their divisions (i.e., transmission, storage, local
distribution, and industrial gas sales must be distinguished from other
purposes and gas commodity purchases).27 6 New accounting rules require
auditing of annual accounts in accordance with the rules of national

270. 1992 Proposal for Common Rules, supra note 99, at 1-9. See generally Third Party
Access Proposals,supra note 208.
271. John Maurice Clark, Toward a Concept of Workable Competition, 30 AM. ECON. REV.
241 (1940).
272. The Internal Energy Market, supra note 80, at 60-61. For example, OFGAS, the
British gas regulatory body, suggested that certain industrial prices are out of line with EC
prices. OFGAS: The EEC Industrial Gas Market, Jan. 1989, at 18-21.
273. Council Directive Concerning a Community Procedure to Improve the Transparency
of Gas and Electricity Prices Charged to Industrial End-Users, 1990 O.J. (L 185) 16. This
goes further than the proposals in The Internal Energy Market, supra note 80, at 27, which
noted the need to "combine a minimum of transparency with dialogue between the parties
concerned and a normal degree of confidentiality (secret statistics)." Id.
274. Achevement du Gaz et de L'Electicit6, supra note 102, at 5.
275. STERN, supra note 138, at 18-19.
276. Achevement du Gaz et de L'Electicit6, supra note 102, art. 21(1), at 65 (Annex 2).
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legislation concerning limited liability companies.2" Unfortunately, the
new transparent figures may not be very revealing in the absence of expressly
defined rules against cross-subsidization and undue preference sanctioned by
a strong European regulatory authority.
This crucial directive thus will have to be buttressed by Community
competition case law.278 Article 90 of the EC Treaty concerns the application of Treaty competition rules to public undertakings that enjoy
"special or exclusive rights" granted by Member States and the power of the
Commission to issue directives remedying relevant mischief.279 Transmission companies could possibly be characterized as entities enjoying special
rights. For example, in the Transparency Directive Case,280 the ECJ
acknowledged the Commission's powers, under Article 90(3), to obtain
information concerning financial dealings between public undertakings and
governments.28' Thus, transparent energy prices will probably result in
cases of a visible regulatory presence via Community competition law.
IV.

OPERATING THE INTERCONNECTED GRID

Article 4(1) of the 1992 Proposal for Common Rules empowers Member
States to grant licenses for the interstate construction and operation of natural
gas, including liquefied natural gas, facilities and transportation systems.2 82
The application procedures must be non-discriminatory, and were to have
been laid down by Member States by July 1993.283 Member States must
set the criteria for the licensing, the building, or the operation of interstate
facilities, transmission and distribution lines, and storage facilities.2 8
These criteria contemplate, among other things, environmental concerns.2 85
An application may be refused "if the transmission or distribution require-

277. Id. art. 21(3), at 65 (Annex 2).
278. The Internal Energy Market, supra note 80, at 24; A SINGLE EUROPEAN MARKET IN
ENERGY, supra note 114, at 54.
279. EC TREATY art. 90, supra note 5.
280. Joined Cases 188-190/1980 France, Italy & United Kingdom v. Commission, 1982
E.C.R. 2545 [hereinafter the Transparency Case] (joint action calling for declaration of
Commission Directive No. 80/723/EEC as void). These powers were controversially used to
implement a general ban on the conferral of certain exclusive rights on state telecommunications agencies. Case 202/88,,France v. Commission, FIN. TIMEs, Apr. 27, 1989 (citing
the Telecommunications Directive Case (16 May 1988, 88/301/EEC)).
281. EC TREATY art. 90(3), supra note 5 (clothing the Commission with a duty of
surveillance, executed by the adoption of directives and decisions addressed to Member States,
which may be either preventative or curative). Article 90(3) provides a "particular procedural
framework for the enforcement of some of the more general obligations resulting from Art.
5(2)." Hancher & Lucas, supra note 98, at 189.
282. 1992 Proposal for Common Rules, supra note 99, art. 4(1), at 64 (Annex 2).
283. Id. art. 4(4), at 65 (Annex 2).
284. Id. art. 4(2), at 64 (Annex 2).
285. Id.
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ments ...

can be satisfied by the existing transmission and distribution

capacities available in the interconnected system at a reasonable and equitable
price. 286 Lastly, Member States must relate their reasons for refusing
28 7
applications and provide for appeals of such refusals.
Article 5 of the 1992 Common Proposal provides for bypass of the
transmission and local distribution facilities by allowing construction of direct
lines. 28

8

Member States are required to meet the directives concerning

interconnected transmission.28 9 The system's operation "shall be assured
individually by each transmission company"'2 90 and "[e]ach transmission
company shall not discriminate between users or classes of users of the system. 291
Article 12 provides that third parties
may apply to a transmission company to enter into an agreement...
for use of its system.
... In response, ... the transmission company shall [either]
propose an agreement ... or ... refuse to make a proposal . . . if

such use would prejudice the transmission or storage of natural gas
or the import or the export of LNG in292fulfillment of any statutory
obligation or contractual commitments.
Proposals for an agreement shall include proposed transmission companies'
293
obligations relating to the entry points where gas will be accepted.
Potential users can request a statement, at a reasonable charge, that will
enable "reasonable assessment" of opportunities available concerning the
system.294
Each transmission company shall publish the basis upon which
the terms of connection to and use of the system will be set. The
publication shall contain sufficient information to enable . . . a
reasonable assessment of the ... [tariffs] that would be payable for

286. Id. art. 4(3), at 64 (Annex 2).
287. Id. art. 4(8), at 66 (Annex 2).
288. Id. art. 5, at 66 (Annex 2).
289. Id. art. 7, at 67 (Annex 2).
290. 1992 Proposal for Common Rules, supra note 99, art. 8(1), at 67 (Annex 2). See
generally Robert Bell & Deborah Porter, A Single European Market for Natural Gas, 9 OIL
& GAS L. & TAX'N REv. 307 (1991).
291. 1992 Proposal for Common Rules, supra note 99, art. 8(5), at 68 (Annex 2).
292. Id. art. 12(1)-(2), at 70-71 (Annex 2).
293. Id. art. 12(3), at 71 (Annex 2).
294. Id. art. 12(4), at 71 (Annex 2).

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 1995

43

Florida Journal of International Law, Vol. 10, Iss. 1 [1995], Art. 6
FLORIDA JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW

[Vol. 10

natural gas transactions involving the use of the system.295
Article 12 also requires that transmission company tariff terms be
"reasonably related to the long-term costs incurred in the provision of the
relevant service, together with a reasonable rate of return on the capital
employed. 2 96
Ominously, "[t]he transmission company shall not
discriminate between any persons or classes of persons in the terms for
connection to its system., 297 In the event that capacities are not used or are
partly used, the contractual right of LNG storage for transmission usage will
298
be lost.
Freedom of third party access to the gas grid requires an interconnected
network. It will, therefore, be the responsibility of the entities in charge of
managing the interconnected network to define "harmonised, transparent and
non-discriminatory procedures" for transportation. 299 A period of "progressive adaptation" is envisaged.3"' Mysteriously, unlike the electricity draft
directive, there is no positive requirement for a gas transmission system
operator." 1 The office is defined, but not mandated.30 2 This omission
begs the question: How will the coordination and rate setting take place?
The "distribution system operator" is defined as an "undertaking having
the responsibility of operating and developing a natural gas distribution
system., 30 3 "Member States shall ensure that natural gas companies are
operated on commercial principles and shall not discriminate between these
undertakings as regards either rights or obligations. ' 3° Thus, the failure
to specifically nominate a distribution system operator implies that the thirdparty access procedures will rely upon the goodwill of pipeline companies.
V. ENFORCING EUROPEAN UNION GAS REGULATION
This part identifies salient elements of EU competition law. Part III
described and criticized the EU third party access proposals. Criticized
aspects of these proposals included the uncertain Community, rate rationale
for third party access volumes, and the lack of competence over pricing for
inter-Community volumes destined for captive core customers. In the
absence of unambiguous rate rationale provisions, recourse will have to be

295.
296.
297.
298.
299.
300.
301.
302.
303.
304.

Id. art. 12(5), at 72 (Annex 2).
1992 Proposal for Common Rules, supra note 99, art. 12(6), at 72 (Annex 2).
Id. art. 12(7), at 72 (Annex 2).
Id. art. 12(8), at 72 (Annex 2).
Id. 4.41, at 18 (Annex 1).
Id. 4.4, at 18 (Annex 1).
Id. 3.3, at 26 (Annex 1).
Id.
Id. art. 2(9), at 62 (Annex 2).
Id. art. 3(1), at 63 (Annex 2).
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made to Community competition law. Accordingly, the general competition
law rules of the European Union will play an important part in resolving
disputes between the Commission and Member States. These disputes will
involve the extent of state aid, cross-subsidization, and other preferences
given to pipeline companies, divergent customer classes, and other market
entities.
A.

Competition Law of The European Union

Commercial competition in the EU falls largely under the ambit of
Articles 85 and 86 of the EC Treaty.30 5 Article 3(g) of the Treaty expressly requires the EU to promote "a system of ensuring that competition in the

305. EC TREATY arts. 85 & 86, supra note 5. Article 85 states:
1. The following shall be prohibited as incompatible with the common
market: all agreements between undertakings, decisions by associations of
undertakings and concerted practices which may affect trade between Member States
and which have as their object or effect the prevention, restriction or distortion of
competition within the common market, and in particular those which:
(a) directly or indirectly fix purchase or selling prices or any other trading
conditions;
(b) limit or control production, markets, technical development, or investment;
(c) share markets or sources of supply;
(d) apply dissimilar conditions to equivalent transactions with other trading
parties, thereby placing them at a competitive disadvantage;
(e) make the conclusion of contracts subject to acceptance by the other parties
of supplementary obligations which, by their nature or according to commercial
usage, have no connection with the subject of such contracts.
2. Any agreements or decisions prohibited pursuant to this Article shall be
automatically void.
Id. art. 85(1)-(2).
Article 85 section 3 states that the European Commission may grant an exemption from
the rest of Article 85 pertaining to agreements deemed to benefit the public. Id. art. 85(3).
Article 86 states,
Any abuse by one or more undertakings of a dominant position within the
common market or in a substantial part of it shall be prohibited as incompatible with
the common market in so far as it may affect trade between Member States.
Such abuse may, in particular, consist in:
(a) directly or indirectly imposing unfair purchase or selling prices or unfair
trading conditions;
(b) limiting production, markets or technical development to the prejudice of
consumers;
(c) applying dissimilar conditions to equivalent transactions with other trading
parties, thereby placing them at a competitive disadvantage;
(d) making the conclusion of contracts subject to acceptance by the other
parties of supplementary obligations which, by their nature or according to
commercial usage, have no connection with the subject of such contracts.
Id.art. 86.
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internal market is not distorted." 3" This central competence concurrently
occupies part of the field with Member State jurisdiction. Commercial policy
competence is reserved for the Member States. "The powers of the
governments of Member States in matters of commercial policy shall not be
affected by this treaty, save as otherwise provided therein."3" 7
Community competition rules should be considered, in addition to
domestic law, in the formation of agreements, the communication of business
policies, and marketing strategies. These rules affect the structure of business
relationships and attempt to regulate anticompetitive practices.
General Community trade and competition provisions will ultimately
sanction cases of noncompliance with the gas transit policy.308 In the
absence of a purposefully built Community regulatory body along the lines
of the American Federal Energy Regulatory Commission or the Canadian
National Energy Board, the general competition rules have been reserved.
The provisions of the Treaty concerning freedom of movement of goods 3 9
and competition"' apply to natural gas. Article 86 is especially relevant
because transmission companies invariably enjoy a dominant position, but
that Article proceeds on an ex post facto, case-by-case basis and does not
The effectiveness of
provide a foundation for proactive rule-making.1
these general competition sanctions tautologically depends upon the gas
transit policy adopted by the European Parliament.
Community competition rules are primarily enforced 31' by the Commission, which has power to investigate infringements and impose fines.313
Because the prohibitive provisions of Articles 85(1) and 86 may have a direct
effect on relations between individuals, the ECJ has held that they give rise
306. Id. art. 3(g).
307. DAINTITH & HANCHER, supra note 119, at 14 n.3. This freedom and the opinion of
the ECJ in Joined Cases 9 and 12/60, Soci6t6 Commerciale Antoine Vloeberghs S.A. v. High
Authority, 1961 E.C.R. 197, has led some commentators to suggest that the ECSC is more like
a free-trade area than a customs union. For instance, a lacunae exists in Community law.
Member States appear free to restrict third country imports. Coal imported from third
countries into one Member State may not necessarily enter into free Community circulation.
Hancher & Lucas, supra note 98, at 180.
308. Grunwald, supra note 168, at 58; see also EC TREATY arts. 30, 34, 37 (the elimination
of quantitative restrictions between States), 85-90 (rules on competition applying to
undertakings), supra note 5.
309. EC TREATY arts. 30-37, supra note 5.
310. Id. arts. 85-93.
311. Id. art. 86.
312. The Competition Act 1980 is part of Britain's antitrust legislation and is coordinated
with European Community Law, particularly EC TREATY Articles 85-86. See EC TREATY
arts. 85-86, supra note 5.
313. Council Regulation 17/62, First Regulation Implementing Articles 85 and 86 of the
Treaty, 1959-1962 O.J. SPEC. ED. 87 [hereinafter Regulation Implementing Articles 85 & 86].
Regulation 17/62 grants the Commission unqualified powers to request information, conduct
inquiries, and undertake investigations. Id.
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to rights requiring protection by the courts of the Member States.3"' Thus
No. 17"' to
limitations are placed upon the use of Article 9 of Regulation
16
the extent that it would deny these individual rights.
The Commission nevertheless retains broad authority. The Commission's
powers of inquiry and investigation are virtually unqualified and the right to
be heard is conferred only in certain instances. The scope or exercise of the
Commission's powers are not expressly limited by reference to fundamental,
human or constitutional rights. "If a limit is to be placed on the Commission's powers, the Court must find it in the 'common law' of the Community."'3 17 Furthermore, following application by interested parties, the
Commission may issue exemptions, negative clearance, or both.3 1 It also
is empowered under Article 85(3) to authorize and grant exemptions to
certain economically beneficial agreements although they contain anticompetitive features.3 19
Only the Commission is empowered to grant exemptions. This can be
done in two ways. Either the Commission will make an individual decision
relating to a specific agreement, but only where the Commission has been
notified of the agreement, or the Commission will grant a block exemption.
Block exemptions are comprised in Commission regulations and provide
automatic exemptions, in most cases without the need for notification.
Various categories of agreements, for example, exclusive distribution,
exclusive purchasing, patent licensing, research and development, and knowhow licensing agreements benefit from block exemptions. Generally, the
purpose of such exemptions is to give greater freedom to create restrictive
agreements, thereby increasing the proportion of research, development, and

314. Case 127/73, Belgische Radio en Televisie & Societe v. SV SABAM, 1974 E.C.R.
51.
315. Id. Subject to review of its decision by the Court of Justice, the Commission shall
have sole power to declare EC Treaty Article 85(1) inapplicable pursuant to Article 85(3) of
the Treaty. Under Article 9(3) of the Regulation, Member States remain competent to apply
EC Treaty Articles 85(1) and 86 in accordance with Article 88, provided the Commission has
not initiated procedure under Council Regulation Article 2 (negative clearance), Article 3
(ordering termination of infringements), or Article 6. Regulation Implementing Articles 85
& 86, supra note 313, at 88.
316. Case 37/79, Anne Marty S.A. v. Estee Lauder S.A., 1980 E.C.R. 2483, 2500.
317. David Edward, ConstitutionalRules of Community Law in EEC Competition Cases,
13 FoRDHAM INT'L L.J. 111, 123 (1989-90).
318. Negative clearance is a procedure allowing businesses to ascertain whether the
Commission considers any of their arrangements to be prohibited under EC Treaty Articles
85 or 86. Undertakings may make application to the Commission, and the Commission,
accordingly, has discretion to decide, based upon the facts in its possession, whether there are
grounds under EC Treaty Articles 85(1) or 86 for action in respect of an agreement, decision,
or practice. Regulation Implementing Articles 85 & 86, supra note 313, at 87; see EC
TREATY arts. 85-86, supra note 5.
319. EC TREATY art. 85(3), supra note 5.
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investment which is committed by both parties. As was previously discussed,
the need to encourage innovation by granting monopoly rights must be
balanced with the need for an "open market."
B.

Agreements Within the Ambit of Article 85(1)

In addition to its general prohibition, Article 85(1) applies to agreements
ranging from clear cut infringements such as price fixing320 and market
sharing, which is an agreement between competitors establishing which is to
supply certain territories or customers, to agreements between competitors to
exchange information, particularly about their prices.321 Article 85 also
proscribes agreements preventing parties from exporting goods from one
Member State to another.3" These agreements are regarded as serious
violations as they undermine the effectiveness of the common market.
Three criteria must be fulfilled for infringement of Article 85(1). There
must be some form of agreement between undertakings,323 the agreement
must affect trade between Member States, and the agreement must have as
its object or effect the restriction of competition within the common
market.32 All juristic persons carrying on economic or commercial activity
are covered by the term "undertaking," but agreements between members of
the same economic group (such as a parent company and a subsidiary or two
subsidiaries of the same parent company), do not normally fall under Article
85(1). These agreements are usually regarded as allocations of economic
functions within one unit and do not violate Article 85(1). However, if the
companies are economically independent, a restrictive pact between them will
probably constitute a breach of Article 85(1).325 Under Article 85(1), the
Court of Justice can thus directly enforce Community rules on competition.

320. Price agreements between buyers or sellers, whether horizontal or vertical, are often
illegal because they fetter consumer choice, and hence competition. For example, in Community v. Bundesverband Deutscher Stahlhandel, 1980 0. J. (L 62) 34, 1980 C.M.L.R. 193,
a cost-calculation formula, where competitors agreed only upon the method by which they
would set their prices, was colorable since model calculations of this type have the effect of
recommendations. They encourage the user companies to work from the figures contained in
the models, or at least to keep close to them, when calculating their costs and thus indirectly
their selling prices.
321. EC TREATY art. 85(1), supra note 5.
322. Id.
323. Case 40/69, Imperial Chem. Indus. v. Commission 1972 E.C.R. 619, 655 [hereinafter
Dyestuffs]. Undertakings involve all kinds of entities, including commercial, distribution, and
services. The European Court reviewed how various economic units formed one economic
entity in order to examine how non-Community undertakings had organized illegal price-fixing
within the Community through subsidiaries under their control. SLYNN, supra note 93, at 64.
324. EC TREATY art. 85(1), supra note 5.
325. See Case 15/74, Centrafarm v. Sterling Drug, 1974 E.C.R. 1147, 2 C.M.L.R. 480
(1980).
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Furthermore, it is not essential to show that the agreement has, in fact,
affected trade between Member States. It is enough that it has such potential
effect.
The basic test of whether an agreement's "object or effect" is the
restriction of competition was enunciated in Socigtg Technique Mini~re v.
Maschinenbau Urm GmbH.326 This case concerned a vertical agreement,
between manufacturer and dealer. The Court stated that an agreement
violates Article 85(1) if it foreseeably affects the pattern of trade between
Member States. Several factors must be addressed in order to ascertain
whether an agreement might affect a pattern of trade. These include: (1) the
nature and quantity of the products concerned; (2) the isolated nature of the
agreement or its position in a series; and, (3) the possibility of other
commercial currents acting on the same products. In sum, if the terms of the
impugned agreement do not reveal a sufficiently deleterious effect on
competition within the ambit of Article 85, then the consequences of the
agreement should be considered. Accordingly, it must be shown that
competition has in fact been prevented or restricted or distorted to an
appreciable extent. Additionally, the Article 85(1)'s prohibition requires the
colorable agreement to have as its "object or effect the prevention, restriction
or distortion of competition within the Common Market. 3 27
Hence, the agreement must be analyzed in its economic context. Even
though an agreement may fall within the ambit of the Article 85 prohibition,
the so-called de minimis rule328 requires that the effect be appreciable. In
Volk v. Vervaecke, the Court ruled that "an agreement falls outside the
prohibition in Article 85 when it has only an insignificant effect on the
markets, taking into account the weak position which the persons concerned
have on the market of the product in question. 329
This judicial guideline did not provide figures defining the size of the
market share needed to overcome the de minimis rule. The Commission has
issued a notice that quantifies the rule with reference to market share and
turnover.33 ° Accordingly, undertakings which produce and distribute goods
and services representing less than 5% of the total market and services with
an aggregate turnover of less than two hundred million ECUs will not fall
under Article 85(1).
Logically, if the object of the agreement is unequivocally anticompetitive,
326. Case 55/65, Societe Technique Mini~re v. Maschinenbau Ulm GmbH., 1966 E.C.R.
235.
327. CHRISTOPHER BELLAMY & GRAHAM D. CHILD, COMMON MARKET LAW OF COMPETITION 257 (3d ed. 1987).
328. Applied in Maschinenbau Ulm, 1966 E.C.R. 235.
329. V61k v. Etablissements J. Vervaecke, 1969 E.C.R. 295, 302, 2 C.M.L.R. 273 (1969).
330. Commission Notice on Agreements of Minor Importance Which Do Not Fall Under
Article 85(1) of the Treaty, 1986 O.J. (C 231) 2.
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such as price fixing and market sharing, it is not necessary to look at its
effect. Territorially, it is not essential that the contravening agreements were
established within the European Union so long as it infringes Article 85(1)
and has effect within the Community. However, the effect of an agreement
both on interstate trade and competition within the common market must be
appreciable. An anticompetitive agreement may be allowed if it "contributes
to improving production or distribution of goods or to promoting technical
or economic progress, while allowing consumers a fair share of the resulting
benefit." 33 ' Only restrictions "indispensable to the attainment of these
objectives" are imposed on undertakings.332 Furthermore, the undertakings
cannot be afforded "the possibility of eliminating competition in respect of
333
a substantial part of the products in question.
C.

Trading Agreements Outside Article 85(1)

A breach of Article 85 only occurs where the agreement appreciably
affects competition and trade within the common market.3 34 The Commission has issued a number of advisory notices listing certain common
arrangements that will normally not be considered violative of Article 85.
For example, selective distribution is a common method of marketing
information technology products. The system is particularly appropriate for
complex information technology products that require sophisticated retail
outlets with staff commanding a high level of expertise to sell the products
and supply back up services to the customer. To be exempt from Article
85(1), the products must have a sufficient level of complexity and the
retailers must be chosen objectively on the basis of nondiscriminatory
qualitative criteria. All sellers who satisfy the criteria and wish to join the
system must be admitted. In AEC v. Commission, a fine of one million ECU
was imposed for refusal to admit qualified sellers.335
D. Abuse of a Dominant Position EC Article 86
Unlike Article 85, which is concerned with anticompetitive agreements
between parties, Article 86 is concerned with conduct that is normally
unilateral. One situation in which Article 86 applies is where the dominant
undertaking has the status of a public undertaking or of an undertaking to
which the Member State has granted exclusive or special rights. In

331.
332.
333.
334.
335.
(1984).

EC TREATY art. 85(3), supra note 5.
Id. art. 85(3a).
Id. art. 85(3b).
Id. art. 85(1).
Case 107/82, AEG-Telefunken AG v. Commission, 1983 E.C.R. 3151, 3 C.M.L.R. 325
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Hoffinann La Roche v. Commission,336 the ECJ defined a dominant position
as "a position of economic strength enjoyed by an undertaking which enables
it to hinder the maintenance of effective competition on the relevant market
by allowing it to behave to an appreciative extent independently of its
competitors and customers and ultimately of consumers., 337 The ECJ has,
however, implicitly limited the scope of Article 86 in Hoffmann La Roche.
On its face, the language of Article 86 suggests that joint dominance by an
entire corporate group is possible. The Court said that an undertaking in a
dominant position to a great extent determines its conduct unilaterally. This
differs from the "conscious parallelism" or parallel courses of conduct that
interact in oligopolies. 338 The Court went on to define abusive practice as
relating to the behavior of an undertaking in a dominant position that
influences the structure of a market to such an extent that by its very
presence the degree of competition is weakened. Also since it has available
recourse to methods not found under normal conditions of competition, it
hinders the maintenance of the degree of competition still existing in the
market and its growth.339
For instance, in Hugin Cash Registers Ltd. v. Commission,34 a cash
register manufacturer in Sweden refused to supply spare parts to Britishbased Liptons, whose business was largely confined to the London area.
Liptons needed the parts to service its customers. The repair activity was
essentially local in character, and it was uneconomical beyond a certain area
336. Case 85/76, Hoffmann La Roche v. Commission, 1979 E.C.R. 461, 3 C.M.L.R. 211
(1979).
337. Id. at 520; see also Michelin v. Commission, 1983 E.C.R. 3461, 3508-09, 1 C.M.L.R.
282 (1985); Case 27/76, United Brands Co. & United Brands Continental v. Commission,
1978 E.C.R. 207, 286; Case 322/81. See generally Mark Friend & Josephine Shaw, Note,
Damagesfor Abuse of DominantPosition, 100 L.Q. REV. 188 (1984).
338. Hoffmann La Roche, 1979 E.C.R. at 461; NICHOLAS GREEN ET AL., THE LEGAL
FOUNDATIONS OF THE SINGLE EUROPEAN MARKET 261 (1991). "Oligopoly" translates from
the Greek as "domination by the few." In the United States, evidence of parallel behavior
alone does not necessarily support an inference of conspiracy. See, e.g., Theatre Enter. v.
Paramount Film Distrib., 346 U.S. 537, 541 (1954) ("Circumstantial evidence of consciously
parallel behavior may have made heavy inroads into the traditional judicial attitude toward
conspiracy, but 'conscious parallelism' has not yet read conspiracy out of the Sherman Act
entirely.") (citation omitted); In re Coordinated Pretrial Proceedings in Petroleum Prod.
Antitrust Litig., 906 F.2d 432 (9th Cir. 1990) (holding that conscious parallelism standing
alone may support an inference of price fixing); Barry v. Blue Cross of Cal., 805 F.2d 866,
866 (9th Cir. 1986) (The fact that several thousand physicians signed identical contracts to
provide services to insurance plan members at predetermined prices does not support an
inference of conspiracy without additional evidence that the physicians' actions were
interdependent.); Supermarket of Homes v. San Fernando Valley Bd. of Realtors, 786 F.2d
1400, 1405 (9th Cir. 1986) (Parallel pricing alone does not prove conspiracy to fix prices.).
339. Hoffmann LaRoche, 1979 E.C.R. at 541.
340. Case 22/78, Hugin Cash Registers Ltd. v. Commission, 1979 E.C.R. 1869; see also
Cutsforth v. Mansfield Inns, [1986] 1 W.L.R. 558 (where Sir Neil Lawson held that the Hugin
principle did not apply in a "network" case).
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from the undertakings' commercial base. Liptons had tried to obtain spare
parts from other Member States, but was generally unable to do so as there
was usually no inter-State trade in spare parts. Nonetheless, since Hugin did
not apply different prices in different markets, the Court held that the spare
parts were not such as to constitute a commodity of commercial interest in
trade between Member States. The product market was for spare parts, not
for cash registers, and the effect was confined to one Member State.
Where a statute confers a monopoly, dominance can easily be determined. If not, dominance can only be defined by reference to a "relevant
In the British Telecommunications34" ' decision, the statutory
market."
monopoly of British Telecommunications was abused by
[t]he use of telephone and telex installations subject to the acceptance
by message-forwarding agencies of an obligation to charge prices
that had no connection with the type and quality of the telecommunication services provided by them, but rather arose out of...
[the monopolist's] desire to protect the revenues of other national
telecommunication authorities.342
Hence, effective enforcement of Article 86 requires a definition of the
relevant market, its territorial extension, and whether one or more companies
have a dominant position.
E.

Concerted Practices

Article 85 prohibits concerted practices that may affect trade between EU
members.34 3 Concerted practices have been defined as "a form of coordination between undertakings which, without going so far as to amount
to an agreement properly so-called, knowingly substitutes a practical cooperation between them for the risks of competition." 3" The presence of
a concerted practice may be made with reference to market characteristics
and the activities of a subsidiary may be imputed to a parent company.
In the Dyestuffs case, 345 Benelux and nearly all the undertakings that
produced aniline dyestuffs in Italy simultaneously and uniformly increased
their prices.3" Evidence was presented on the equivalence of the rates of
increase, the similarity of the dates upon which the increases were announced, the simultaneous dispatch of instructions to subsidiaries, and the

341.
342.
343.
344.
345.
346.

1982 O.J. (L 360) 36, aff'd, Case 41/83, Italy v. Commission, 1985 E.C.R. 873.
1982 O.J. (L360) at 40.
EC TREATY art. 85(1), supra note 5.
EC TREATY art. 85, supra note 5.
Dyestuffs, 1972 E.C.R. at 619.
Id. at 642.
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informal contact between the undertakings. 34 7 The applicants averred both
that each producer naturally followed the price-leader, who initiated the
increase, and that the price increases reflected parallel behavior in an
oligopolistic market.34 8 Parallel behavior by itself was not held to constitute a concerted practice, but it amounted to strong evidence of such a
practice if the resulting competition does not correspond to the normal
conditions of the market. 34 9 Normal market conditions are a question of
fact, and the Court found the dyestuffs market to be fragmented and divided
along national lines. The Court stated that although every producer is free
to change his prices, taking into account in so doing the present or
foreseeable conduct of his competitors, nevertheless it is contrary to the rules
on competition contained in the Treaty for a producer to co-operate with his
competitors to determine a coordinated course of action relating to a price
increase and to ensure success by prior elimination of all uncertainty as to
each other's conduct such as the amount, subject-matter, date, and place of
the increases. 5
In the Dyestuffs case, parallel yet independent behavior could explain
neither the price increase timing nor the prior announcement of price
The Commission investigated and found that jurisdiction
changes.
existed.3 5 ' The fines it ultimately imposed were upheld despite the
352
companies' headquarters being based outside of the European Union.
The parents and subsidiaries were held to be a single economic undertaking,
353
because the parent companies controlled the EU-based subsidiaries.
In the Sugar Cartel case,3 4 the Court reviewed a contractual clause
prohibiting sugar supply competition in the Netherlands between an agent
and a principal occupying a dominant position.355 If the agent performs
duties which are economically similar to those of an independent dealer, then
such an arrangement may constitute an abuse of a dominant position. The
Court held that it was not necessary to prove the existence of an actual plan
to take part in concerted practices.356 It held that the terms "coordination"
and "cooperation" meant that each economic operator must independently
determine the policy which it intends to adopt. 357 Furthermore, there
347. Id. at 643.
348. Id.
349. Id. at 642.
350. Id.

351. Id. The Court found that oligopolistic interdependence was a form of concerted
practice. Id. at 655.
352. Dyestuffs, 1972 E.C.R. at 647.
353. Id. at 645.

354. Suiker Unie UA v. Commission, 1975 E.C.R. 1663, 1942 [hereinafter Sugar Cartel].
355. Id.
356. Id. at 1663.
357. Id.
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should not be any direct or indirect contact between operators which either
purposely or inadvertently influences the conduct on the market of an actual
or potential competitor or discloses to such a competitor the course of
conduct which they themselves have decided to adopt or contemplate
adopting on the market.358
Three broad elements are, therefore, essential for a concerted practice to
exist. First, a form of coordination or practical cooperation between
undertakings must replace their independent action.
Secondly, this
coordination needs to be achieved through direct or indirect contact. Lastly,
the aim must be to remove "in advance any uncertainty as to the future
conduct of their competitors.""3 9
Following Michelin v. Commission,360 a dominant position cannot exist
in an abstract form, but it can exist within the framework of the concept of
"relevant market. 36' In Europemballage Corp. & Continental Can Co. v.
Commission,362 the Court of Justice held that the delimitation of the
relevant product market was crucial in the identification of the dominant
position.3 63 This case involved a merger which effectively strengthened a
dominant position. The ECJ, finding that the arrangement offended Article
86, said, "Abuse may ... occur if an undertaking in a dominant position
strengthens such position in a way that the degree of dominance reached
substantially fetters competition i.e., that only undertakings remain in the
market whose behavior depends on the dominant one.
In Continental Can, the Court also stated that "Articles 85 (concerted
actions) and 86 (abusive conduct) cannot be interpreted in such a way that
' 365
they contradict each other, because they serve to achieve the same aim.
Without explaining how the markets were separate from each other, the
Commission had found that the company and its subsidiary had a dominant
position in the canned meat, canned fish, and metal tops markets. The Court
of Justice insisted that the Commission should define the relevant product
market.3 6 Consequently, the relevant market is defined with reference to

358. Sugar Cartel, 1975 E.C.R. at 1663; BELLAMY & CHILD, supra note 327, at 58.
359. Sugar Cartel, 1975 E.C.R. at 1663.
360. Case 322/81, Michelin v. Commission, 1983 E.C.R. 3461.
361. Managing Intellectual Property Issue 4th Jan. 1991, at 25.
362. Case 6/72, 1973 E.C.R. 215, 245, 1 C.M.L.R. 343 (1973). The Court in Continental
Can found that "Articles 85 and 86 cannot be interpreted in such a way that they contradict
each other, because they serve to achieve the same aim." Id.
363. Id.
364. Id.
365. Id. at 244; see also Commission Decision Relating to a Proceeding Under Articles 85
and 86 of the EEC Treaty, 1989 O.J. (L 33) 44 (applying Articles 85 and 86 to the same
facts).
366. Ivo VAN BAEL & JEAN-FRANCOIS BELLIS, COMPETITION LAW OF THE EEC 57-74 (2d
ed. 1990).
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those characteristics of the products in question which makes them
particularly suited to satisfy an inelastic need and which make them
interchangeable with other products only to a limited extent.367
For example, in United Brands, the issue turned on whether bananas
were in the same market as other fruit. 36

The Court found that different

fruits were in different markets, stating that bananas are "singled out by such
special features distinguishing it (bananas) from other fruits, that it is only
to a limited extent interchangeable with them and is only exposed to their
competition in a way that is hardly perceptible., 369 The Court defined a
dominant position as "a position of economic strength enjoyed by an
undertaking which enables it ... to behave to an appreciable extent

independently of its competitors, customers and ultimately its con370
sumers."
Thus, the Commission's decisions on Article 86 consistently apply the
test of interchangeability of the relevant products to the classification of the
relevant product market. Conceptually, a relevant product market is helpful,
but labelling or dissecting a market is often problematic.
In summary, to define the relevant product market one must consider the
products as belonging to different markets and evaluate the commercial level
upon which they are sold. It is necessary to define the relevant product
market in terms of a particular geographic area, where the conditions for
competition are sufficiently similar for all competitors. This also helps in
determining with which other undertakings the company is in competition.
However, due to technical, legal, and practical difficulties, certain products
can only be supplied within a narrow area. Because of this, the cost of
transporting products is an important factor. Some goods are so expensive
to transport in relation to their value that it would not be economic to attempt
to sell them in distant markets. Therefore, where the geographic market is
narrowly considered, even a firm which operates on a localized basis might
have a dominant position.
F. Elimination of QuantitativeRestrictions
Articles 30 through 36 purport to guarantee the unrestricted movement
of goods.371' Article 30 states the basic principle that "[q]uantitative
restrictions on imports [and exports,] and all measures having equivalent

367. Continental Can, 1973 E.C.R. at 215.
368. United Brands, 1978 E.C.R. at 286.
369. Id. at 207.
370. Id.
371. EC TREATY arts. 30-36, supra note 5.
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effect shall, ... be prohibited between Member States. 3 72 Violation of
these provisions exposes a Member State to infringement proceedings under
Article 169."' Article 30 has been interpreted very broadly, and any
measure which affects trade in goods between Member States may fall within
its prohibition. 37 4 The jurisprudence of the ECJ has added to the scope of
Article 30, which encompasses all trading rules enacted by Member States
that are capable of directly or indirectly posing an actual or potential barrier
to inter-Community trade.
In the Cassis de Dion375 case, ECJ set forth a test to identify those
national measures that do not breach Article 30. Such measures were
deemed "necessary in order to satisfy mandatory requirements relating in
particular to the effectiveness of fiscal supervision, the protection of public
health, the fairness of commercial transactions and the defence of the
consumer." 376 The Court also held that goods lawfully produced and
marketed in a Member State should be allowed into another Member
State. 37 7 Thus, national measures that effectively hinder intra-Community
trade are prohibited by Article 30, unless the Member State proves that they
are indispensable.
An important qualification to application of Article 30 is that the
measures at issue must be governmental or be undertaken by bodies operating
under the government's auspices. The exceptions under Article 36 to the
principle of free movement of goods are restrictively interpreted. The test is
essentially that measures taken should not be disproportionate to their
objective.
Some restrictions on the movement of goods are allowed.378 Article 36
allows Member States to prohibit or restrict imports or exports on grounds
of "public security. '379 In the Campus Oil Case, the ECJ set a precedent
for the recognition of public security in the energy sector. 380 It decided
372. Id. arts. 30 (imports), 34 § 1 (exports); see Procureur du Roi v. Dassonville, 1974
E.C.R. 837, 852. This prohibition applies to any trade agreements between "Member States
which are capable of hampering, directly or indirectly, actually or potentially, intraCommunity trade." Id. at 865. In the event of urgent requirements, an exception is made for
obstacles, such as include effective tax control, the protection of fair trade, and consumer
protection. Case 120/78, Renew-Zentral AG v. Bundesmonopolverwaltung ftr Branntwein,
1979 E.C.R. 649 [hereinafter Cassis de Dyon].
373. EC TREATY art. 169, supra note 5.
374. Procureurdu Roi, 1974 E.C.R. at 837.
375. Cassis de Dijon, 1979 E.C.R. at 649.
376. Id. at 658.
377. Id. at 656-57.
378. EC TREATY art. 36, supra note 5.
379. Id. at 674-75; Cassis De Dijon, 1979 E.CR. at 674-75.
380. Case 72/83, Campus Oil Ltd. v. Minister for Indus. & Energy, 1984 E.C.R. 2727, 3
C.M.L.R. 544 (1984). The Irish Government required importers to purchase a proportion of
their requirements of petroleum products from a State-owned refinery in Ireland, at a price to
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that a Member State could use public security as a justification for intra3 81
Union trade restrictions concerning imported oil during times of shortage.
The Court stated that:
Petroleum products, because of their exceptional importance as an
energy source in the modern economy, are of fundamental importance for a country's existence since not only its economy but above
all its institutions, its essential public services and even the survival
of its inhabitants depend upon them. An interruption of supplies of
petroleum products, with the resultant dangers for the country's
existence, could therefore seriously affect the public security that
Article 36 allows States to protect.38 2
The ECJ also held that Article 36 may, in certain cases, protect
noneconomic interests by holding that:
[T]o come within the ambit of Article 36, the rules in question must
be justified by objective circumstances corresponding to the needs of
public security. Once that justification has been established, the fact
that the rules are of such a nature as to make it possible to achieve,
in addition to the objectives covered by the concept of public
security, other objectives of an economic nature which the Member
State may also seek to achieve, does not exclude the application of

Article 36.383
Public security exceptions have been interpreted broadly. While
restrictions under Article 34 have usually been on exports, the so-called
Dassonville formula implies application to both exports and imports.
Article 34 only concerns measures by Member States whose specific object
or effect restricts export patterns. 38 5 Differential domestic trade within a

be determined by the Government. Id. at 2730. While this measure had some equivalent
effect to a quantitative restriction, the Court acknowledged the political and economic factors
linked to security of petroleum supplies by stating:
[1]n light of the seriousness of the consequences that an interruption in supplies of
petroleum products may have for a country's existence, the aim of ensuring a
minimum supply of petroleum products at all times is to be regarded as transcending
purely economic considerations and thus as capable of constituting an objective
covered by the concept of public security.
Id. at 2751.
381. Id.
382. Id.
383. Id. at 2752.
384. Dassonville, 1974 E.C.R. at 837.
385. EC TREATY art. 34, supra note 5.
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Member State is, thus 386
far, more common than differential export trade
States.
Member
between
A breach of Article 30 triggers all appropriate remedies normally
available under national law. In the 1990 Factortame Judgment3 87 decision, it was held by the ECJ that no person can come between an individual
and his Community rights. 88 In other words, rules of national law must
yield to rules of Community law. Procedural restrictions in national law
which make it difficult or impossible to obtain effective remedies must be
disregarded. The supremacy of Community Law should simplify attempts
to obtain damages and injunctions against the British Government for breach
of its EC Treaty obligations under Article 30. Additionally, an aggrieved
party may, if the Member State has failed to satisfy its Treaty obligations,
complain to the Commission and request that it exercise its powers under
the Commission is empowered to take a Member State
Article 169, by which
389
before the ECJ.
Article 103(4) provides for legislative action if difficulties arise in the
supply of certain products, including energy products. 39 ° Article 213 lays
out the manner in which the Commission may collect information required
to fulfill its designated tasks. 39 Article 235 authorizes the Council to
where it has not been
legislate in areas, including price transparency,
392
specifically empowered by the Treaty.
Under the Community Anti-Dumping Regulation, 393 non-Community
products are to be deemed "dumped" on the common market if they are sold
to the Community at a price below the price at which they are sold on the
home market of their origin, and if such sales cause injury to Community
industry. 394 The export prices and normal values of the product are
compared and allowances may be made for import charges, indirect taxes,
and selling expenses. Any margin between the two prices is known as the
386. Hancher & Lucas, supra note 98, at 185-86. Thus, the so-called indistinctly
applicable measures doctrine, as expounded in Cassis de Dijon, 1979 E.C.R. at 649, is not

thought to apply to exports. See generally PETER

OLIVER, FREE MOVEMENT OF GOODS IN
THE EC UNDER ARTICLES 30 TO 36 OF THE ROME TREATY 160 (2d ed. 1988); Eric L. White,

In Search of the Limits to Article 30 of the EEC Treaty, 26 COMMON MKT. L. REv. 235, 278
(1989).
387. The principles of direct effect and supremacy of Community legislation were recognized as being essential even to the point of overriding national substantive and procedural
law. Case C-123/89, Factortame v. Secretary of State for Transport, 1990 E.C.R. 1-2433.
388. Id.
389. Id.
390. EC TREATY art. 103(4), supra note 5.
391. Id. art. 213.
392. Id. art. 235.
393. Council Regulation 2423/88 on Protection Against Dumped or Subsidized Imports
from Countries Not Members of the EEC, 1988 O.J. (L 209) 1.
394. Id.
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"dumping margin."3 95 Information technology products have been central
to cases brought involving antidumping duties.
G.

Competition Law Compliance Programs

The Commission may be influenced by a corporate program, instituted
after investigation into a company's affairs has begun, that endeavors to
ensure that the company's business strategy will comply with Community
competition legislation at all times in the future. The Commission approves
of such programs and, although it has no power to require a program to be
instituted, it often encourages companies that are in breach of competition
rules to undertake compliance programs.
The Commission has no power to award damages, but frequently
emphasizes the direct effects of Articles 85 and 86 that national courts must
enforce. The Commission can, however, impose fines. 39 6 The statistical
evidence indicates that the overall level of fines imposed by the Commission
is increasing. In 1984, fines for infringements of EC competition law totalled
23.7 million ECUs. By 1988, the figure had risen to 80.7 million ECUs.
While it should never be assumed that a competition law compliance program
will prevent every possible breach of the relevant legislation in the future, a
properly designed and operated compliance program will significantly reduce
the incidence of problems.397
The Commission's decision in the IJsselcentrale case 398 reinforced the

395. Id.
396. EC TREATY art. 87(2a), supra note 5.
397. Council Regulation 2423/88, 1988 O.J. (L209) at 28.
398. 1991 O.J. (L 28) 32; Achevement du Gaz et de L'Electricit6, supra note 102, § 3.1,
at 4. At issue in the case was whether four Dutch electricity generators (IJsselcentrale) in a
joint venture "vehicle for cooperation" with NV Samenwerkende Elektriciteit-sproduktiebedrijven (SEP) in the Netherlands violated EC Treaty Article 85(1).
The agreement laid down import bans, exclusive purchasing obligations (preventing the
importation of electricity by the complainants), unilateral price settings, and equalization
charges. The Commission held that the agreement constituted an infringement of Article 85(1)
of the Treaty insofar as it had the object or effect of impeding imports by private industrial
consumers and exports outside the public supply area by the distribution companies and
private industrial consumers, notably firms generating their own electricity. Furthermore, the
restriction on exports by distributors did not satisfy the conditions for application of Treaty
Article 90(2). "Undertakings entrusted with the operation of services of general economic
interest [are] ...subject to the rules on competition in so far as the. . . rules [do] not obstruct
the performance, in law or in fact." Id. art. 90(2).
The Commission noted, "There is no apparent reason why exports by these distributors
should endanger the public supply. As long as distributors are in a position to meet their
supply obligations domestically, there is no reason to prevent them from exploiting any
surpluses by exporting them." Ijsselcentrale, 1991 O.J. (L 28) at 48.
The electricity industry does not possess special features within the meaning of Article
90(2) that would allow an exception to be made. Note that in Case 155/73, Guiseppi Sacchi,
1974 E.C.R. 409, the ECJ strictly interpreted the Article 90(2) exception. In order to qualify,
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Treaty rules on competition. In that case, an agreement to restrict electricity
imports was found to have violated Article 85.399 Despite the emergence
of initial steps for reform, gas and electricity industries in most Member
States enjoy exclusive rights.4°° The Commission, however, is preparing
two directives, based upon the specific rules concerning state enterprises
found in Article 37, which governs state monopolies of a commercial
character, and in Article 90, to compel Member States [to] withdraw all of
their exclusive and special rights."' Additionally, the Commission recently
commenced infringement proceedings against Member States that maintain
exclusive import and export rights concerning electricity and natural gas in
40 2
contravention of Article 37 of the Treaty.
Another objective factor to be taken into account is whether the
agreement is one of a network of agreements, such as a manufacturerdistributor arrangement. Network related agreements may affect inter-State
trade pursuant to Article 85(1). Whether a particular domestic agreement
falls within Article 85(1) will be a question of fact in each case, subject to
whether there is an appreciable effect on trade or competition. Provisions in
a domestic agreement that restrict the sale of competing products or provide
for exclusive purchasing may affect inter-State trade, subject to the de
minimis rule,40 3 but other provisions may not.
H. Merger Control
In general, Article 85(1) prohibits cartels.4° If an agreement falls afoul
of Article 85(1), it will be void unless an exemption, based upon the
undertakings must show that the application of the competition rules would be incompatible
with the performance of their tasks. EC TREATY art. 90(2), supra note 5.
399. Achevement du Gaz et de L'Electricit6, supra note 102, § 3.1, at 4.
400. Id. § 4.1, at 5.
401. Id. § 4.3, at 6; see EC TREATY, arts. 37 & 90, supra note 5.
402. Achevement du Gaz et de L'Electricit6, supra note 102, § 3.1, at 4.
403. The "effects doctrine" postulates that jurisdiction is founded when competition within
the Community has an effect exceeding the so-called de minimis (triviality) threshold. See
Joined Cases 89, 104, 114, 116, 117 & 125-29/85, A. Ahlstr6m Osakeyhti6 & Others v.
Commission [Wood Pulp Cases] 1988 E.C.R., for cases on extraterritoriality.
404. EC TREATY art. 85(1), supra note 5. "Cartel" includes any agreements or decisions
between independent undertakings in concentrated practices that have as their object or effect
the prevention, restriction, or distortion of competition. Such agreements or decisions are also
prohibited by EC Treaty Article 85(1). As Adam Smith said in 1776:
People in the same trade seldom meet together, even for merriment and diversion,
but the conversation ends in a conspiracy against the public, or in some contrivance
to raise prices ... though the law cannot hinder people of the same trade from
sometimes assembling together, it ought to do nothing to facilitate such assemblies;
much less to render them necessary.
ADAM SMITH, TIHE WEALTH OF NATIONS 128 (Edwin Cannan ed., Random House, 1937)
(1776).
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agreement having some benefit to the common market, is given by the
European Commission pursuant to Article 85(3).415 A Regulation on
merger control came into force on September 1990.406
The merger control regulation preempts related Member State antitrust
powers and requires that the Commission be notified of and vested with
exclusive jurisdiction over all concentrations having a Community dimension. 40 7 This completed the creation of legal instruments deemed necessary
to prevent anti-competitive behavior from hindering market integration.0 8
European Union joint ventures have been characterized as being subject to
joint control. They exist where two or more undertakings are economically
interdependent, for example, conducting joint research and development
projects, buying, production, and distribution.0 9
Community conceptions of merger control and cartel control differ
legislatively. The former bring independent corporate entities under common
control and affect competition by concentrating supply power. The latter
restricts competition by coordinating competitive behavior.4 1 °
Antitrust law in other jurisdictions generally prohibits cartels and allows
mergers.4 ' Under Community law, joint ventures that are mergers fall
within the ambit of the notification requirement and control procedure. Joint
ventures that infringe upon the cartel prohibition are enforceable only upon
conditioned exemption. A joint venture's effect can
receipt of a blanket or 412
be difficult to classify.
Articles 85 and 86 remain applicable to operations whose "object or
effect" concerns the coordination of the competitive behavior of undertakings. 1 3 These remain independent as the merger control regulation
excludes coordinating operations. 1 4

405. EC TREATY art. 85(3), supra note 5.
406. Council Regulation 4064/89, on the Control of Concentrations Between Undertakings,
1989 O.J. (L 395) 1.
407. The Regulation entails mergers of firms with a combined turnover of more than five
billion ECUs, where at least two firms have a combined turnover of over 250 million ECUs
in the Community, and each of the undertakings concerned achieves more than two-thirds of
its aggregate Community-wide turnover within one and the same Member State. Id. at 3.
408. COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES, supra note 210, at 1.

409. See EC TREATY art. 85, supra note 5 for rules prohibiting agreements between
undertakings.
410. Horst-Peter G6tting & Werner Nikowitz, EEC Merger Control: Distinguishing
ConcentrativeJoint Ventures from Cooperative Joint Ventures, 13 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 185,

186 (1989-90).
411. Id. Compare The Restrictive Trading Practices Act of 1976, C.34 at 321 (the British
Cartel Provisions) with The Fair Trading Act of 1973, 41 at 125 (the powers of the
Monopolies Merger Commission to assess mergers on public interest grounds.)
412. G6tting & Nikowitz, supra note 410, at 186.
413. EC TREATY arts. 85-86, supra note 5.

414. G6tting & Nikowitz, supra note 410, at 189.
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CONTROLLING STATE AID

Member States must not substitute the kind of protectionism abolished
during the market integration process with State aids or exclusive rights
accorded to monopolies. State aids have a distortive and disunifying
effect."' These types of subsidies should be reduced for competition and
macroeconomic policy reasons as well as for general economic Community
cohesion. Facilitating Community cooperation and promoting the Single
European Act which underpins the internal market, requires greater
transparency,4 16 including the publication of surveys and details of all State
aids.417 Other measures which accompany trade liberalization include
standardization.
Subsidized electricity or gas tariffs can distort competition, including
competition within energy-intensive industries. The Commission has
intervened in two cases of alleged aid, via artificially low tariffs, to industrial
gas and electricity consumers in the Netherlands. 1 8
VII.

CONCLUSION

Significant progress is being made in developing an internal energy
market in the European Union, including the creation of a natural gas "right
of transit." The changing legal regime must be seen as part of an on-going
415. The effect, not the form, is the test. Thus, preferential gas tariffs for gas supplied by
the Dutch Gasunie to the fertilizer industry were characterized as State aid. The Dutch
Government's participation in Gasunie, its veto over Gasunie's pricing policy, and the fact that
by approving lower tariffs it forfeited tax revenue were enough to characterize the aid as a
State resource. Case 169/84, COFAZ v. Commission, 1986 E.C.R. 391.
416. "Price transparency is the obligation on the part of undertakings to make known the
prices they charge in certain transactions." Mestmiicker, supra note 132, at 704. For
example, Article 60 of the European Coal and Steel Community Treaty "statutorily" requires
entities to publish prices, hence requirements of this sort (or in private agreements) lessens the
probability of discrimination. Treaty Establishing the European Coal and Steel Community
[ECSC Treaty] art. 60. In contrast with the EEC Treaty, ECSC Treaty Article 60(1) provides
that pricing practices contrary to articles 2, 3, and 4 be prohibited. In particular, the ECSC
Treaty proscribes discriminatory practices within the common market involving the application
by a seller of dissimilar conditions to comparable transactions, especially on grounds of the
nationality of the buyer. Id. at art. 60(2). For these purposes, the price list and conditions
of sale applied by undertakings within the common market must be made public to the extent
and in the manner prescribed by the High Authority after consulting the Consultative
Committee.
417. COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN CoMMUNrrIEs, supra note 210, at preface.
418. Joint Cases Nos. 67, 68, 70/85, 1985 E.C.R. 1315; Case 169/84, Compagne Francaise
de I'Azote SAv. Commission, 1986 E.C.R. 391; see also The Court's Special Tariff Decisions
Concerning EDF: NN 120/88 (P6chiney), IP (89) 752, Oct. 11/89. O.J. No. L 185/16, 1
7.7.1990. This goes further than the proposals in The Internal Energy Market, supra note 80,
79 that noted the need to "combine a minimum of transparency with dialogue between the
parties concerned and a normal degree of confidentiality (secret statistics)."
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process, with promotion of the Community public interest as its ultimate goal
in the monopolistic energy transmission sector. This so-called harmonization
process coincidentally involves a constitutional resettlement process.
Community goals require some reduction in Member State competence
(national deregulation) and some corresponding increase in central
government power. Increased governmental intervention is being substituted
for free market forces in an attempt to balance the general interest with
individual claims.
European Union harmonization is thus a progressive effort to remove
barriers. For lack of better nomenclature, this ever closer union resembles
federalism. The adoption of various legal documents and policies are
hallmarks of the Internal Energy Market program, but the pace of harmonization is incremental. Unlike Canada or the United States, the European
Community's federal government structural rules were not set up a priori.
Furthermore, the European Community does not have a strong natural gas
regulatory authority. Nonetheless, de facto sovereignty of Member States
(who desire to remain in the Community) is lessening, although de jure
sovereignty remains. Reduction of Member State sovereignty is the price of
reaping the advantages of a common marketplace with a common
microeconomic policy.
Microeconomic policy concerns governmental initiatives that attempt to
influence sectors of the economy. Because regulatory decisions have an
extraterritorial application and affect those in other jurisdictions along a
common grid, expectation interests can be prejudiced by capricious and
inconsistent changes in regulatory policy. Thus, market tensions exist in
North America despite the North American Free Trade Agreement and longstanding comity. In North America, domestic regulators have a legal
mandate to protect the interests of producers, brokers, pipelines, and
consumers within their jurisdiction. Legislative and proprietary conflicts with
companion tiers of government are characteristics of federalism. Thus, the
scope, frequency, and sophistication of these democratic conflicts will
increase as the Internal Energy Market matures. This maturation process
includes the re-regulation of current EU natural gas transportation arrangements.
Instead of ad hoc carriage arrangements by European pipeline companies,
the shared authority of a federal-like Internal Energy Market will, to some
extent, systematize procedures. Presently, the market does not function
freely. Thus, ad hoc arrangements will have to be replaced in order to
achieve allocative efficiency. Microeconomic theory indicates that control
of the commodity price of natural gas is unnecessary and supports
deregulation of cartel-controlled commodity prices in this sense. There is
also a strong normative or philosophical movement in favor of such
deregulation to the extent that gas brokerage-transportation contracts can be
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unbundled. In order to achieve this result, efficacious and centralized
transportation regulation, involving transparent rates, is needed to control the
monopolies which will constitute an integrated European gas grid. Pipeline
regulation licensing and rate setting are quasi-judicial functions that require
coordination and consistency in order to cope with conflict and minimize
disputes. The natural gas draft directive and price transparency directives are
part of a symbiotic dichotomy: both must function efficiently to facilitate the
goal of third party access. Without strong natural gas utility regulation and
the attendant unfettering of competition, concentration of power and
misallocation of resources will continue.
Unfortunately, anticompetitive forces appear to be restraining the pace
and scope of Community natural gas transit reform. Full liberalization will
have to wait, and the actual details will depend on the success of the second
phase. Negative interest group behavior seeks to preserve the monopolistic
transmission-broker systems within Member States.
Some industry
spokesmen appear dogmatic and intransigent. They reflect the position of
their respective interest groups by ostensibly supporting competition
principles and lamenting excessive governmental controls. Competition in
the gas transportation industry is usually successful in the sense that it weeds
out real competitors. Pipeline interests are monopolies or near monopolies
characterized by economies of scale. They need a check on their inherent
tendency to seek windfall profits.
Initially, the proposed right of transit will only marginally benefit core
residential customers. Unfortunately, the Community's gas interconnection
and coordination rules are so weak that they amount to a policy of
voluntarism. The European Commission Energy Council appears to be
reserving its formal competition powers until, and unless, market forces and
the specific directives fail to achieve their goals. This is a form of negotiated
regulation.
Accordingly, the U.S. and Canadian experience is of marginal political
relevance to the European common carriage question. It does, however, offer
a vivid regulatory and procedural benchmark. Unlike the small group of
North Sea-based producer cartels, both the United States and Canada possess
a mature industry currently coupled with thousands of producers and
considerable excess capacity.
Following the collapse of communism, the 1990s is the age of a new
Europe complete with new markets and opportunities. The North American
experience provides a historical account of a changing industry and the legal
mechanisms employed to balance the interests of the main industry actors.
The North American restructuring experience presents a source of information for use by European natural gas regulators, who will have to cope
with the inevitable transition costs of a new regime.
Compared to Europeans, Americans and Canadians have greater practical
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experience in energy regulation. This experience includes a history of
market-determined prices, subsequent regulated prices, and then a move back
to deregulated prices. The environmental impact of the industry also
maintains an extremely high profile. Nevertheless, the associated experience
with direct sales in both countries may be of general interest to Europeans,
who must make important value decisions concerning the stewardship of a
vital energy resource. The physical fact of excess capacity has been proven,
and it warrants third party access in order to allocate resources for the
greatest public benefit.
The theoretical economic efficiency of capacity brokering is also
compelling, even though the current conflict between the California Public
Utilities Commission, Alberta producers, and Canadian regulators looks like
a longer-term restructuring problem. As the European gas grid evolves and
interconnection increases, the sale of excess capacity by third party brokers
will also increase. By alleviating the institutional Community barriers to
market entry, commercially founded realities will encourage renegotiation of
supply contracts.
Proponents of third party access argue that Community and nonCommunity producers will compete better if given greater access to European
markets at the reduced prices likely to result from an unimpeded market.
They believe that the gas industry profits unduly from its monopolistic
position, and that market entry of rivals is effectively precluded. Unfortunately, strong opponents counter the weak alliance in favor of third party
access. Opponents, including self-serving industry insiders, assert that it that
has yet to be proven empirically that direct purchases from alternate suppliers
are indeed compatible with security of supply and low prices. Yet
empirically, Canadian core customer prices have fallen (albeit not as much
as consumer groups expected) following the advent of direct sales.
European skeptics' strategic opposition to third party access involves
tactics of bluffing and being dilatory with constructive responses to the
initiatives. The industry fears that the modest "right of transit" proposals will
snowball into full-fledged common carriage involving redistribution of risks
at their expense, and, therefore, seeks to maintain its protected position.
Since present supply arrangements are fully contracted, and direct sales have
to be financially attractive in order to induce purchasers to leave the security
of system gas, it seems likely that relatively small amounts of direct sales
will occur. The existing take-or-pay agreements were freely negotiated with
suppliers and it is not probable that they will be put aside by administrative
fiat. The sanctity of contracts principle should be upheld to protect the
legitimate expectation interests of capital.
In any event, the new regime arguably lacks the administrative teeth to
vary the contracts that contemplate both transportation and brokerage
functions. If these contracts are not voluntarily renegotiated, then their
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buyers must honor them and face simultaneous competition from the
suppliers' direct sales. The controlling contract provisions will probably call
for prices above the unregulated market-clearing price. Hence, the right of
transit will require hard choices to be made concerning competition. Many
more proactive steps will have to be taken by the European Commission.
A balance will have to be struck between pipeline ownership and third
party carriage. One way to do this is to encourage pipeline profits by
incentive rate regulation. However, given the comparative United States and
Canadian experience, deregulation is not a panacea for neutralizing negative
interest group behavior. In Canada, anticompetitive forces are prevailing as
far as core (residential or small commercial) customers are concerned. Well
organized Canadian interest groups have influenced the determination of this
public policy initiative, receiving the benefits of deregulation through crosssubsidization by poorly organized core market customers. The onus should
be on proponents of deregulation to prove that the system is superior to the
status quo. The difficulties of implementing deregulation should be analyzed
beforehand, and deregulation should be implemented quickly once decided
upon.
Quick implementation is an economic and legal ideal that is difficult to
achieve due to a lack of political consensus. Nevertheless, quick implementation would be more efficacious than the gradual approach recommended by
some commentators. A gradual approach will admittedly lessen the acuteness
of market restructuring, yet at the same time extend its duration and tensions.
History suggests that those who object to change are usually those who stand
to benefit most from the retention of the status quo.
The efficacy of EU natural gas regulation will largely rest upon the
pertinent powers provided to the Commission and the delegated entity
responsible for regulating gas transportation through the common grid. The
new regime will have a long learning curve before costs come down.
Monopoly gas supply used to be seen as a low-risk activity with a return
comparable to government bonds. The creative chaos of third party
competition will definitely cause market dislocation, but should eventually
yield competitive dynamics. Such creative chaos is a political hotbed. It
includes the prospect of economic gains and losses for the players, including
newcomer brokers who purchase transportation services.
In order to be effective, the right of transit requires increased and
consistent regulation in the public interest. A level playing field must
provide participants with notice of accurate or transparent commodity and
transportation rates. It is by no means clear, for example, whether rolled-in
tolls or incremental tolls will be employed to finance capacity expansion.
Nor is it clear whether so-called "as-billed" tolls will be allowed or whether
some sort of incentive rate regulation can take root by domestic regulators.
Successful Community harmonization will necessitate harmonization of
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the public utility law principles. Arguments about subsidiarity should not
obfuscate the need for a strong Community regulatory body that could
occupy the inter-Community field of natural gas transportation rates. The
European gas industry is presently secretive about toll methodology
compared to the United States and Canada, which openly investigate rate
rationales. The European gas industry, being understandably predicated upon
profit maximization, eschews the scrutiny that leonine regulatory powers will
bring to their monopoly business.
Hence, the Community natural gas regulatory relationship and objectives
concerning transit and different market structures are not yet settled. They
are nascent. They will alter the status quo but they are certainly not radical.
Some sort of regulation is needed to compensate for market failure in the
natural gas transmission sector. Stronger Community regulation is also
needed to accommodate access to pipelines by non-Community importers.
Regrettably, the regulatory stewardship of this vital energy source does not
go far enough nor fast enough with its reforms. For instance, the proposed
direct sale dispute resolution procedure is uncertain and not binding as it
stands. Provisions establishing the operators of the interconnected transmission system seem insufficient to protect the public interest. Other than
general Community competition law provisions, there are no specific legal
instruments aimed at harnessing the concentrated upstream producer cartels.
Politicization of natural gas transportation seems inevitable in Europe
because the stakes are high. Yet this need not be so. One way of depoliticizing the issue might be to create a European Energy Commission with
wide investigative and regulatory powers. Like North America, the European
Union should utilize public regulatory hearings where a wide body of
intervenors regularly have standing to participate and utilize complex
socioeconomic and financial data to advocate their viewpoints. Policy
implications of related areas like environmental impact assessment could be
dealt with in this forum. A regulatory dialogue could develop between the
main actors, concurrently allowing a wide range of intervenors to air their
concerns.
Admittedly, the regulatory hearing process has been criticized for
regulatory capture, whereby the vested and vociferous industry interest
groups dominate the agenda. Despite its faults, it brings to a public forum
matters of public interest. Such a European Energy Commission should
employ administrative rule-making procedures and be a court of first
instance. Presently, the Community gas transit regulatory regime has
decentralized dispute resolution procedures requiring time-consuming resort
to adjudication in national and Community forums. Ideally, disputes could
be resolved in a competent central tribunal, but these constructive criticisms
will require hard-won political consensus.
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